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Abstract 
With years of media liberalization and marketization in mainland China, the Chinese 
film industry has gradually embraced the joint partnership of foreign media capital and 
Chinese local private capital in the commencement of century. The huge, relatively 
unexploited market in mainland China exhibits great attractiveness to foreign media 
investors; meanwhile, it presents a challenge for the Chinese state, the rising Chinese 
private investors, as well as the foreign investors as to how to negotiate and inteact with 
other players to achieve a win-win situation. While China begins to focus on cultural 
exports and global markets, this study shifts the attention from the local going ‘global’ to 
the domestic market, that is, the global enters into the ‘local’. Thus, this study takes 
Crazy Stone as a case study to analyze the successful strategies of localization of the 
foreign media capitals. Crazy Stone, as a coproduction by Focus Film Ltd. (Hong Kong), 
Warner China Film HG and Concord Creation Int'l Beijing Co., Ltd., performs a 
triangular interaction between the complex power relations of state control and global 
capitalism. It also entails the state, the rising Chinese private capital and foreign media 
capital in this newly constituted power bloc. Approaching from a political economic 
perspective, this study uses interviews, participant observation and textual analysis to 
examine strategies of localization of the foreign media capital. This study finds that 
localization of the foreign media capital occurs in all four aspects of film industry, i.e. 
the creative, the content, the economic and marketing strategies, with a local cultural 
product, Crazy Stone, and a joint venture company, Warner China Film HG, as the results 
of localization. More importantly, such localization of foreign media capital is an 
accomplishment in two senses. First, for the sake of market penetration, the foreign 
media corporations have to adopt the strategies of localization and show adherence to the 
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mainland Chinese state; second, as the mainland Chinese government gradually 
embraces foreign capital into the Chinese media industries, localization becomes a 
prerequisite and national strategy for foreign investors to access to the mainland Chinese 
market. The success of Crazy Stone and the localization of the foreign media capital 
demonstrates a possible and successful strategy for foreign media corporations into 
mainland China. It also presents a picture of possible development models in the future 
Chinese film industry in the age of globalization. 
Keywords: localization, globalization, Chinese film industry, foreign media capital, 
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Chapter 1. Local Media Industry in the Global Context 
1.1 Introduction 
With a huge potential internal market, mainland China has always been the targeted 
market of global media conglomerates for cultural exportation in the era of globalization. 
Since China's access to World Trade Organization (WTO), the foreign media companies 
seem to have seen the opportunity to penetrate the Chinese market. However, Chinese 
cultural exceptionalism still prevails across all media in mainland China (Shi, 2006)，as 
media serve more as ideological tools than merely entertainment or cultural industry. 
Therefore, only in recent years can those foreign investors really enjoy the benefits of 
the openness of the Chinese market. 
During years of reforms, the film industry has been the last to open of all kinds of 
media in mainland China. Only since the mid 1990s has Chinese private investment been 
allowed to enter the Chinese film industry and only since the early 2000s has foreign 
media capital dabbled in the Chinese film industry. In the eyes of the foreign media 
companies, the Chinese film market is like a diamond mine that is full of profitable 
prospect. With a population of 1.3 billion, the annual domestic box-office can reach 
RMB 13 billion, if each person spends only RMB 10 every year to watch a film in 
cinema. The actual current statistics, however, show only RMB 2.5 billion box-office in 
2006，and the total generation profit of the Chinese film industry is RMB 6 billion, only 
0.6% of that of Hollywood. Furthermore, the average annual expense on films per 
mainland Chinese person is barely RMB 0.8 (USD 0.1) (Yin and Wang, 2005). The 
foreign media companies consider these as positive signs that there is great potential in 
this unexploited market. In the winter of 2004，Warner Bros, got the first admission 
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ticket into this huge market with the first mainland-foreign joint venture film company, 
Warner China Film HG. In the year 2005, the mainland Chinese film industry toasted its 
100 years of filmmaking and the arrival of the Chinese blockbuster age. Together with a 
series of favorable film policies encouraging private and foreign capital investment, the 
Chinese film industry is witnessing a great prosperity and is gradually embracing the 
foreign media capital. A new power bloc is gradually reconstituted by the state, the rising 
Chinese private capital and the foreign media capital. 
Facing this opportunity and challenge, how can the foreign media companies 
succeed and fully enjoy the profits in mainland China market? What strategies should 
they use to negotiate with the Chinese state in this relatively liberal era of mainland 
China? This study uses Crazy Stone as a case to illustrate one possible successful 
strategy of foreign media investments in mainland Chinese film market. While some 
recent researchers have focused on the 'reverse flow' of Chinese films in the global 
market (e.g. Wu, H. and J. M. Chan, 2007)，and celebrated the coming of the Chinese 
blockbusters age and their position in the global cinemas, this study will shift its 
attention from the global film market to the domestic market. As the market is gradually 
opens and becomes accessible for foreign media corporations, challenges exist for both 
the Chinese government and the foreign media investors. 
In revising cultural globalization, some scholars reintroduce the role of the nation-
state. They suggest a 'media-political complex' (Curran and Park, 2000:14), or a 
'politico-economic integration' (Thomas, 2001:72), which indicates a possible result 
when transnational media corporations come across authoritarian political regimes. 
Specifically, many scholarly studies put forth the ideas for the successful entry of the 
transnational media corporations into the Mainland China market, for example, 
2 
cooperating with local joint venture partners (Curtin, 2005)，or forming a state-global 
media complex (Fung, 2006). 
The case of Crazy Stone and its major production company, Warner China Film 
HG, shows a more complicated and interactive negotiation with the nation-state. They 
have performed a triangular interaction among the complex power relations, state control 
and global capitalism. They also entail the state, the rising Chinese private capital and 
foreign media capital. How was the foreign media capital localized in the case of Crazy 
Stone”, How do the power relations between the Chinese state control, the emerging 
Chinese private capital and the foreign media capital interplay in the localization process 
of the foreign media capital? Approaching from a political economic perspective, this 
study tackles the successful localization strategies. Interviews and participant 
observation, supplemented by textual analysis, are adopted to examine the film 
production, distribution, exhibition and marketing process, and it also attempts to make 
critical analysis on how the foreign capital has localized and negotiated with the state 
control. 
With an investment of only RMB 3 million (USD 0.4 million), Crazy Stone, 
directed by a young, little-known director and with no film stars, generated RMB 23 
million (USD 2.5 million) box-office revenues. In the summer of 2006, Crazy Stone 
caused a craze among the mainland Chinese audiences and hit the domestic box-office. 
First shown in the Shanghai International Film festival 10 days before its official 
cinematic release, unexpectedly, it received high media coverage. The day after its first 
show, more than 20 mainland Chinese newspapers reported Crazy Stone and gave it great 
praise 1. After its first weekend of cinematic release, its box-office reached RMB 2 
million, and the second week's box-office got increased by 100%^. What is more, the 
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third week's box-office continued to climb and exceeded the previous two, which is quite 
extraordinary and miraculous in the film industry. Audiences showed great fanaticism 
towards Crazy Stone. In Beijing, an audience member was so enthusiastic after watching 
Crazy Stone that he bought all the tickets left in that cinema for that night and gave them 
to passersby for free, because he wanted to share this fantastic film with others^. In 
addition, different kinds of seminars and forums were held by the State Administration of 
Radio Film & Television (SARFT), filmmakers and academia all around the country 
especially to discuss the phenomena and success of Crazy Stone. Another piece of 
evidence is that if one searches on the largest Chinese search engine, Baidu, with the key 
word ‘Crazy Stone' (in Chinese), more than three million websites appearl 
The sudden success of Crazy Stone has drawn public as well as researchers' 
attention. Being the first film presented by Warner China Film HG, the first foreign joint 
venture film company in mainland China, and a co-production by Focus Film Ltd. (Hong 
Kong), Warner China Film HG and Concord Creation Int'l Beijing Co., Ltd., the 
successful localization of foreign media capital in the case of Crazy Stone and the film 
company Warner China Film HG has great implications for the current Chinese film 
industry, as well as the foreign media investors and local media investors. Based on the 
concrete analysis of successful strategies that Crazy Stone and its production company 
took, this study also attempts to present a picture of film development models that for 
foreign media investors to access the mainland Chinese film market and for the mainland 
Chinese film industry to expand. 
1.2 The Issues of Globalization 
In the past few decades, we have witnessed profound political and economic changes all 
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around the world. As these changes have gradually unfolded, globalization has been 
evolving from a prophecy to a facet of daily life. Today globalization becomes a major 
frame of reference in international communication research. Since it is poorly defined 
among social scientists, I would like to first conceptualize and systematically introduce 
the trends and models of globalization. 
From the late 1960s, media imperialism emerged and argued that the global 
economic system is dominated by the developed countries, which are at the centre or 
core, while the third world countries are at the periphery of the system with little control 
over their economic and political development (Tomlinson, 1991). The one-way flow of 
media products and services from the centre to the periphery undermined their cultures 
and values (Hamelink, 1983; Schiller, 1992). 
Critiques of the media imperialism challenge the assumptions that it makes and 
criticize it as being too simple and for overlooking the dimension of heterogenization in 
cultural contact. Barker (1997) argues that globalization is a 'multi-directional and multi-
dimensional set of processes'. When the global media corporations enter a local market, 
they always have to adapt to local cultures and join with local partners. Thus, cultural 
processes are considered as dialectic, involving simultaneously globalizing tendencies 
and local involvement, cultural practices and dynamics (Giddens, 1991). Some studies 
show that there is local resistance to American domination, and audiences' preference for 
local programs rather than the foreign ones (Lee, 1988; Straubhaar, 1991; Chad ha and 
Kavoori, 2000). Straubhaar (1991) suggests 'cultural proximity' as a key determiner in 
the markets, which is a competitive edge for local cultures. Guild and Joyce (2006) also 
find that in spite of the strong appeal of the extravagant Hollywood blockbusters films, 
audiences in each country have continued to show considerable interest in films that are 
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tied to their particular cultural context and are made in their own language. In addition, it 
is criticized that in the media imperialism discourse, American, western and capitalist can 
be used interchangeably (Curran and Park, 2000). And although there is global cultural 
diversity, it is being restructured by underlying hegemonic dynamics and the American 
conception of the world absorbs those diverse cultural differences (Hall, 1997). 
Thus, in the 1980s and 1990s, a second frame, cultural globalization was 
introduced. This theoretical framework shifts from a western discourse to a universal 
phenomenon that is transforming the entire world. Instead of referring to the advanced 
countries or the west as the centre, "globalization is only partly westernization ... and is 
increasingly decentered" (Giddens, 1999:31). In addition, “the transnational 
communication system ... offers opportunities of new forms of bonding and solidarity, 
new ways of forging cultural communities" (Ang, 1990:252). While media imperialism 
suggests cultural homogenization or the globalization's destruction of the local, 
paradoxically, cultural globalization encourages local peoples to rediscover the 'local' 
that they have neglected or forgotten in their drive towards western-imposed 
modernization during the past decades (Hall, 1991; Featherstone, 1993; Robertson, 
1995). As Kraidy argues，the cultural imperialism thesis should give way to "a benign 
vision of global cultural diversity, local cultural resistance, and cross-cultural fusion" 
(Kraidy, 2005: vii). What is called local is to a large extent "constructed on a trans- or 
super-local basis" (Robertson, 1995: 26). Such rediscovery of the 'local' leads us to 
understand globalization in conjunction with localization and investigate the power 
relations between the global and the local. 
Localization is the means to adapt the foreign products and texts to a local context. 
The adaptation to the local serves the intention in the world of capitalistic production for 
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increasingly global markets (Robertson, 1995). In the countries where direct link-ups are 
unsuitable in terms of languages, markets or production technology, the media industry 
contrived the localization of content as a means of appropriation of the globalized media 
(Siriyuvasak, 2000). Localization aims to tailor media products for local preferences, 
and one way to achieve localization is co-production (Iwabuchi, 2000). In the Asian and 
mainland Chinese media market, due to the government's highly controlled media 
environment, transnational media companies have to resort to localization strategies to 
enter into the local markets. For example, Star TV and MTV adapted their strategy to the 
mainland Chinese context to produce localized programs by finding local partners (Fung, 
2006; Iwabuchi, 2000; Weber, 2003). These localizing strategies manifested in various 
ways, and those transnational media companies who enjoy success in the mainland 
Chinese market have embraced the strategy of localization, 'focusing specifically on 
relationship building, cultural sensitivity and technology and knowledge transfer through 
cooperative production' (Weber, 2003). Generally, these previous studies focus more on 
the localization of media texts/content and strategy (e.g., Iwabuchi, 2000; Kraidy, 2005; 
Weber, 2003). 
Bhabha (1994) observes that natives and minorities strike back at imperial 
domination by recourse to the hybridization strategy, and Iwabuchi (2000) also regards 
localization as a kind of hybridization. In contrast to a globalization-as-homogenization 
thesis, hybridization is concerned more with the site of local negotiation with the global 
(Iwabuchi, 2000). For example, locals appropriate global goods, conventions and styles, 
including music, cuisine, cinema, fashion and so on, and inscribe their everyday 
meaning into them (Bhabha, 1994; Young，2003). Many recent studies have focused on 
such cultural exchange and formation as an interaction between the global and the local. 
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A series of concepts are related to these arguments, such as 'glocalization' (Robertson, 
1995), 'hybridization' (Pieterse，1995) and 'transculturation' (Chan, 2002), which 
indicates the globalization of the local and the localization of the global. 
To interpret and explain cultural globalization, Diana Crane (2002) review the 
principal theoretical models. 
Process of . . , . . , 
Model Cultural Principal Actors, Possible 
^ . . Sites Consequences Transmission 
Cultural Global media Homogenization of 
imperialism/ Media Center-periphery , 
. . r r y conglomerates culture 
imperialism 
Regional and 
Cultural flows/ „ „ national Hybridization of 
networks “ ^ conglomerates and culture 
corporations 
Audiences, publics, 
„ ,, Center-periphery; cultural Negotiation, Reception theory ’ ‘ . � , J ； ‘ ？‘ ^ ‘‘ multidirectional entrepreneurs, resistance 
gatekeepers 
Cultural policy Global cites, 
strategies museums, heritage 
e.g., preservation, Framing of national sites, cultural Competition, 
resistance, cultures memory, media, negotiation 
refraining, ministries of culture 
^localization and trade 
Table J. Models of Cultural Globalization (Crane, 2002:2) 
Crane (2002) claims that the second model, the cultural flows or network model, is 
useful for understanding the roles of regional cultures and in the future it should be 
increasingly relevant to the study of cultural globalization as more regions and countries 
produce various forms of media content and send them to other countries, which exhibits 
'subnetworks' within the global network. The rising concern of the reversed cultural flow 
and the rediscovery of local culture implicate the increasing responses by the local 
cultural industries towards globalization. Long at the 'periphery' and the passive receiver 
8 
of global cultural invasion in the media imperialism framework, Asia was named as a 
new growth area in the new era (Keane, 2004) and a site to examine a "global-local co-
habitation" that transnational media corporations strategically ally with domestic 
producers (Thomas, 2006). Over the years, many Asian countries have considered foreign 
media and cultural products as threatening and usually have adopted protectionist 
strategies for media and cultural imports (Hong and Hsu, 1999). Protectionism can be 
found among Asian countries, e.g. Korean, Singapore, and mainland China. With 
government intervention, policy and control, they intended to resist the invasion of 
globalization and sustain their own industries. However, many governments failed to 
sustain this type of protectionism due to pressure from the global market. Wang (1997) 
observes that a sudden shift in Asian countries' policies from "passive protection" to 
"active promotion" of local industries to counter western "cultural invasion" occurred 
during the mid 1990s. For example, in the 1990s the Korean government had no choice 
but to open all levels of the domestic market (Lee & Joe，2000) and later shifted its 
cultural policy to adopt the globalization "actively" and "positively" (Dal, 2006). These 
countries make an active response to the pressures of globalization on local cultural 
industries_not only resisting but also expanding and globalizing local markets一pursuit 
of their own globalization. A good example is Bollywood, which is in battle with 
Hollywood, and another example the acquisition of CBS Records and Columbia Pictures 
by Sony, a Japanese corporation, demonstrating a close alliance with transnational media 
corporations. There are new and significant trends that the American model of 
commercial and competitive media organization, which once represented a real threat to 
local media and cultural industries across the world, has been integrated by Asian 
countries (Baneerjee，2002). And the emergence of new media production capabilities in 
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Asia, e.g., mainland China, makes us reconsider other analytical methods (Keane, 2006). 
Keane (2006) introduces a five-part framework to study Asian media development, (1) 
world factory model (low-cost outsourcing), (2) isomorphism and cloning, (3) cultural 
technology transfer, joint venture/co-productions, and franchising, (4) niche markets, and 
(5) cultural/industrial milieu (creative clusters) (Keane, 2006). 
However, such studies focus on and tackle the issues of cultural interactions 
through processes of cultural localization/hybridization on content level, and less 
attention is paid to the integration at economic level or reasoning from the economic 
base—the local integration with global capitalism. Whether this cultural hybridization is 
a product of the integration at economic level has not yet been fully examined. When 
global media corporations collaborate with the local partners and reconstitute a new 
power bloc, who has the dominance in the production of cultural contents should also be 
taken into account. Crane (2002) suggests the understanding of cultural globalization 
should begin with an examination of the economic organizations and political 
institutions which contribute or attempt to respond to it. In the case of China, after its 
open policy and access to the WTO, China has gradually embraced global capitalism. 
Zhao (2003) specifically points out that through its bureaucratically-controlled and 
market-driven media industries, China becomes an integral part of global capitalism. 
This not only means that more and more foreign media capitals are penetrating the 
Chinese market, but also that Chinese local capitals are taking initiatives to be 
globalized (Schiller, 2003). Therefore, power relations in this newly constituted power 
bloc between the Chinese state capital, the foreign capitals and the Chinese emerging 
private capital, and the possible cultural media products by this integration will be 
significant issues/subjects to be examined. 
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Moreover, both in the cultural globalization and global capitalism argument, the 
nation-state is in dire trouble, and it is "susceptible to the influence of transnational 
agencies" (Chan, 2005:173)，and globalization may eventually lead to the decline (Held, 
1990) or even the end (Ohmae, 1995) of the nation-states. Advocates insist that 
transnational corporations with stronger economic power over the nation-states have the 
capacity to locate and reach whatever market while accountable to no national 
governments (Aksoy and Robins, 1992). However, numerous studies around the world 
that examine the transnational media corporations meeting with local governments, 
indicate that the nation states are all but dead. Curran and Park emphasize "the 
continuing importance of the nation" (Curran and Park, 2000:16) and they put forth that, 
"it is that the nation—its history, cultural tradition, economic development, national 
configuration of power, and state policies—is still very important in shaping the media's 
global system" (Curran and Park, 2000:16). They acknowledge the "inexorable march 
toward media liberalization' and marketization in societies all around the world. In some 
cases when the transnational media corporations come across with authoritarian political 
regimes, it will result in a "media-political complex" (Curran and Park, 2000:14), or a 
"politico-economic integration" (Thomas，2001:72). 
When it comes to the mainland Chinese context, Ma (2000) suggests that it should 
modify and adapt the existing theories to this particular and unique context, since "the 
configuration of the Chinese media contrasts sharply with the situation of the west, yet 
the characteristics of the Chinese case are commensurate with western media theories" 
(Ma, 2000:32). He puts forth the 'state-market complex', which indicates that the state 
and the market are structurally coexisting, applicable in the mainland Chinese context. 
Similarly, Fung (2006) introduces a state-global media complex, which illustrates the 
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transnational media corporations partnered with the Chinese authorities. Also, Zhao 
(2003:60) suggests the new "pattern of inclusion and exclusion" which as well entails 
the emerging integrated complex and indicates the foreign capital and the Chinese state 
forces intersect to restructure the Chinese media industries. 
1.3 Cultural Industries: Political Economy in Practice 
When studying the Chinese media industries in the context of globalization, Zhao 
(2003:60) suggests that the trajectory of the Chinese media industries' integration with 
the global capitalist system should be understood through "a transnational and 
transcultural political economic perspective". 
Political economy of communication focuses on the media ownership as a means 
to explore the power structure behind. Approaching from the political economy 
perspective, in the case of cultural industries, Golding and Murdock (2000) invited three 
areas of analysis, concerning the production of cultural products, the texts and cultural 
consumption. Similarly, Mosco (1996) pointed out that "political economy is the study of 
the social relations, particularly the power relations, mutually constitute the production, 
distribution and consumption of resources". Kerr and Flynn (2003) note that an 
examination of media producers/distributors is neither to return to cultural imperialist 
debates which mistook the media for culture nor to ignore the agency of users; rather it 
is a call to examine the relative distribution of power between producers and consumers 
and the relative importance of access to production in relation to access to distribution. 
Similarly, Garnham (2000) emphasizes the important role of distribution, and he notes 
that a strong distribution position within a given industry may ultimately become a 
greater source of dominance than strength in production. As in the cultural industrial 
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chain nowadays, the production is not necessarily created within a given company; 
instead, it can be a strategic combination of production team. Therefore，distribution 
may well be the most important constituent in a vertically integrated company. 
David Hesmondhalgh (2002), in The Cultural Industries, uses a figure that draws 
attention to the interconiiectedness of the various aspects of culture and the 
understanding of the dynamics of cultural production and of regulation/policy. As 
Hesmondhalgh notes, most studies cover only two or three aspects in this figure. 
^jProductionl 
Identity^ j \ _ consumption 
Texts!, •[regulation 
Figure 1. The circuit of culture (du Gay et al., 1997) 
In a more focused discussion, Lampel and Shamsie (2006) suggest an 
organizational perspective to fiilly appreciate the impact of globalization on cultural 
industries, the organizations that produce, distribute and market cultural products operate 
at the cutting edge of globalization. 
Specifically, when studying the media industry in China, it is essential to 
emphasize and examine the role of the state. Liu (2004) introduces three aspects in 
discussing the state's control: first, the control and policy in response to the new 
technology; second, the control and policy in response to globalization and invasion of 
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transnational media corporations; third, the role of the state in coordinating the internal 
industry. 
1.4 Hollywood Reacquainted^ 
Since China's access to the WTO, the Chinese film industry has long been claiming that 
the 'wolves are coming'. This metaphor of 'wolves' always refers to Hollywood 
blockbusters and the global media conglomerates. The transnational media corporations 
are considered to be one of the 'major power brokers of our time' (Richard, 1997:xi)，and 
a major force in shaping the world's economy or even a private government (Jacoby, 
1984). Lee (2004) puts forth that globalization in a sense is Americanization, and 
America is the only transnational media exporter. In this section, Hollywood's experience 
in expanding markets will be discussed, as well as its re introduction to mainland Chinese 
cinemas. 
In the age of globalization, as described by Time Warner, globalization dictated 
that the top players in the business develop long-term strategies to build on a strong base 
of operations at home while achieving 'a major presence in all of the world's important 
markets’.6 As in the largest media market in the world, the American domestic market, 
Time Warner, Disney and Viacom dominate one third of the market, and Vivendi-
Universal, Bertelsmann, News Corporation and Sony make up another one third (Lee, 
2004). Thus, astute marketing and distribution are crucial not only to the major media 
corporations' domination of domestic markets, but also to their ever-growing incursions 
on foreign markets (Hoskins et al., 1997; Jarvie, 1998; Scott, 2000). Since 1995，the costs 
of Hollywood features films released by the majors have on average consistently 
exceeded their domestic box office returns, so that foreign box-office earnings are now 
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critical to overall profitability (Vogel, 1998). A tremendous growth in the total volume of 
exports occurs since 1986，from 1,628 million US dollars to 7,566 million US dollars 
(Survey of Current Business, US Bureau of Economic Analysis). The Asia-Pacific region 
is one of the main destinations of exports. From 1986 to 1999 it made up around 20% of 
the foreign box-office returns, following European markets (Segrave, 1997). 
However, contrary to the views expressed by European critics about the 'dumping' 
of Hollywood films on foreign markets, which means selling the cultural products in 
another market at a price that is lower than in the domestic market, Hollywood's trump 
card in global markets is strategic trade rather than dumping (Scott, 2002). In practice, 
this meant that companies upgraded international operations to a privileged position by 
expanding 'horizontally' to tap emerging markets worldwide, by expanding 'vertically' to 
form alliances with independent producers to enlarge their rosters, and by 'partnering' 
with foreign investors to secure new sources of financing (Balio, 1998). As 
Christopherson and Storper (1986，1987) suggest, a transformation of the classical 
vertically-integrated studio system of Hollywood into the vertically-disintegrated 
production complex has emerged. 
In the case of Hollywood's exportation to China, Hollywood's blockbusters were 
reacquainted to the Chinese cinemas in the mid-1990s, after a series of institutional 
reforms of the Chinese media industry aimed at marketization. Not only did the Chinese 
state begin to welcome foreign blockbusters at that time, but also the transnational media 
conglomerates were eager to explore the mainland Chinese market. The Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA) especially founded a committee dealing with the trade 
relationship with mainland China, and those media conglomerates canvassed the national 
congress for legislation that facilitates their trading with China. These means were taken 
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so as to penetrate this largest potential media market in the world. Meanwhile, the 
Ministry of Radio Film Television of mainland China, formerly the State Administration 
of Radio Film & Television (SARFT)，loosely defined the criteria for imports as 
reflecting up-to-date global cultural achievement and representing excellence of 
cinematic art and technique. Such cultural achievements and artistic and technological 
excellence were apparently measured by either the target films' budget scale, star power 
or box-office (Zhu, 2003). As a result, Hollywood's blockbusters were reintroduced to 
the Chinese market in 1995, for the first time after the establishment of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). And this Hollywood 
re introduction in 1995 aroused Chinese film industry's 'big picture 
consciousness/awareness,' which is the realization of the significance of sufficient 
production investment in making quality films (Zhu, 2003). The first imported 
Hollywood's blockbuster, The Fugitive, was, quite coincidentally, Warner Bros. Pictures 
film. The imports generated huge box-office revenues, which made up 7 0 % ~ 80% of 
the total Chinese box-office in 1995 (Zhu, 2003). Moreover, the reintroduction of 
Hollywood's blockbusters attracted audiences to go back to the cinema. This change in 
habits has had a profound influence on the future development of the Chinese film 
industry. (The policy reforms will be discussed further in the following chapter.) 
From the experience of Hollywood's development and the expansion of 
transnational media corporations, I conclude four major points that the weaker film 
industries can learn. Firstly, a strong local base or sufficient domestic market is crucial to 
the film industry in expanding and succeeding in global markets. A film industry should 
first strengthen its internal capacity and then gradually develop its overseas markets. 
Besides the scale of industry development and long history, the reasons for Hollywood's 
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dominance of the world's cinemas are the scope of the domestic market and competition. 
Secondly, in the age of globalization, one single film company cannot succeed in the 
world's screens by its own effort; instead, it should ally with local or foreign talents or 
investment. Thirdly, a mature and complete industry chain, from production to 
distribution to exhibition, adds much value to the competition capacity in the film market. 
One of the most remarkable advantages that Hollywood holds over other film industries 
in the world is its advanced distribution network. As Manfred, Chairman of Hong Kong 
Film Awards Association, points out in his talk at "Blockbuster Critic", the reason the 
Taiwan film industry has been in depression for the recent 20 years is not a lack of 
investment or talents but its distribution networks, which are dominated by the eight 
majors.7 Last but not least, supportive government policy is important in the protection 
and expansion of the domestic film industry. 
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Chapter 2. Industrial Reforms and the Current Development of the 
Chinese Film Industry 
2.1 Trajectory of the Chinese Film Industrial Reforms 
The globalization of economic activity has forced many nation-states around the world 
to reconsider their national economic policies. As well，the state-owned enterprises and 
government-protected monopolies are gradually exhibiting deficiency and inefficiency 
in the face of globalization, due to their highly centralized and politicized organizations, 
overstaffing and dependence on government subsidies (Richard, 1997). Thus, a 
worldwide tendency towards deregulated states involvement in business has emerged. 
However, the challenge of regulatory reform is especially difficult for those nation-states 
whose planning structures were highly centralized (Richard, 1997) while opportunities 
for transnational media capital investment in a foreign market are highly correlated with 
the level of openness in this nation-state. 
In the case of mainland China, as a liberalizing authoritarian nation-state, media 
always represent a conjunction of commercial and state ideology that play out the 
tension between the state control, the rising Chinese private capital and the foreign 
media capital in the era of globalization. Media has long been state-controlled and has 
protected monopolies in mainland China, for its function as ideological apparatus and 
the mouthpiece of the government. As mentioned previously, such central planning 
structures and operations caused deficiency and weak competitiveness in face of the 
penetration of foreign media corporations. One way for nation-states to overcome this 
challenge is to infuse their economies with foreign capital and promote a joint 
partnership. At the same time, it is also a highly efficient way for foreign media capital 
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to overcome the regulatory barriers to penetrate the foreign media markets by smoothly 
integrating itself with the local economy (Richard, 1997). Thus, there was an increase in 
requests and pressure, from both the internal market and the external investors, for a 
series of media reforms aimed at deregulation and marketization. In the case of the film 
industry, Chinese cinema has also undergone a series of reforms in response to the 
global penetration. State policies are of vital importance for the development of the 
Chinese film industry. Yin and Wang (2005) have pointed out that the recent years of 
Chinese film development have benefited from the industrial reforms and policies. They 
opine that state policy is due, to a certain extent, the productivity of the Chinese film 
industry. Thus, the trajectory of the Chinese film industrial reforms is a good point to 
start a comprehensive understanding and study of the Chinese film industry. 
Mapping the trajectory of Chinese film industrial reforms in time periods, there 
are three phases. The first phase is a planned economy which lasted until the mid 1980s, 
the second phase is the transformation from the mid 1980s to the end of 1990s from a 
planned economy to a market economy, and the third phase is the management system's 
approaching to legislation and restriction by legal regulations. In this paper, I will divide 
the trajectory into three parts in terms of the targets of these reforms, and start from the 
open policy of 1978. The first part is the internal industrial reform, which had a direct 
impact on the internal film industry. The second is the reform of external policy, which 
had indirect but profound effects on Chinese film industry. Last but not least, it will 
cover some issues on Closer Economic Partner Agreement (CEPA), signed and came 
into effect on January 2004，which promotes the joint economic prosperity and 
development of mainland China and Hong Kong. This new policy signifies a new era of 
co-production by mainland China and Hong Kong. 
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2.11 The Internal Industrial Reform 
As a communist regime, mainland China was established and guided by a planned 
economy, following the Soviet Union. Under this economic institution, the roles of 
media were to reinforce the regime and propagate the state ideology. Therefore, all 
media industries were state-owned. Since the reform in 1978，the socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics was inaugurated. The economic guiding policy 
was shifted from a planned economy to a market economy. A definition and illustration 
of a 'socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics' is defined and illustrated by 
the Chinese Communist Party: 
Socialist market economy system is integrated with the fundamental socialist system. To 
establish socialist market economy is to put the market under the state's macro control and let 
the market play the basic role in integrating and distributing resources. To achieve this goal, 
(we) must stand on public ownership as the core, invite various economic constituents, and 
further transform the operation system of the state-owned corporations.® 
This economic reform makes the Chinese private capital invest in the media 
industry a possibility. Since the mid 1980s，the Chinese film industry has continued to 
go through a series of institutional reforms aimed at liberalization and marketisation. 
However, not until the end of 1992, when the Chinese Communist Party 14th 
Congress firmly established the socialist market economy as a guiding policy, could 
comprehensive reforms on the Chinese film industry be truly executed. In the face of 
pressure to access the WTO, the Chinese state carried out a series of institutional 
reforms to restructure media industries. In sum, its main core was to integrate resources 
and composites of the film industry and reform its management system, and to protect 
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the internal market while restricting the external penetration, in order to meet the 
extensive development of media industries and market competition. In January 1993， 
SARFT issued some new regulations concerning the reinforcement of film industry 
reforms, 'Suggestions on the Deepening of Chinese Film Industry's Institutional 
Reform' (Ni, 1994:51). The main core was to steer film production, distribution and 
exhibition towards the newly established socialist market economy system. Two main 
measures were taken and had profound influence on the ongoing film industry reform. 
Under the planned economy and previous policy, the state-owned China Film 
Corporation (CFC) acted as the central distributor and had exclusive rights for film 
distribution in mainland China cinemas. Under the new policy, the production 
companies or the companies that own the film's distribution right can directly distribute 
films to the local distributors. However, CFC still has exclusive distribution rights for 
imported films. Nevertheless, it has implications that managerial autonomy of the 
Chinese film industry has obtained official sanction, and multiple players and capitals 
participation becomes a possibility. Liu (2004) regards this as the most significant and 
profound reform in the Chinese films industry since the open policy in mainland China 
in 1978. 
In August 1994, SARFT issued another notice also concerning film distribution. It 
confirmed and restated that those who own the film distribution rights can directly 
distribute films to 21 provincial and municipal distributors in mainland China. Further 
distribution reform eventually pushed production reform into the forefront in the mid-
1990s (Zhu，2003). Between 1993 and 1995, the year that notice was taken into effect, 
more Chinese private capitals dabbled in the film industry and, as well, foreign capitals, 
mainly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, penetrated into mainland China on a limited scale 
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by co-production. In 1995，the film industry policy was further loosened. Previously, 
only 16 state-owned production studios had the film production quota which had the 
state-authorized production and distribution rights. This became a high threshold for the 
mainland Chinese private capital as well as the foreign media capital to enter the 
Chinese film industry. Under the newly effective policy, besides those 16 state-owned 
production studios, other production companies can also have the film production quota 
and are allowed to invite private capital. That was the year two mainland Chinese film 
tycoons, Zhang Weiping, the producer of Zhang Yimou's films, and Wang Zhongjun, 
the producer of Feng Xiaogang's films, entered the Chinese film industry, and they have 
largely reactivated the market. However, the private capital and private film companies 
did not have independent production rights until the end of 2002，when SARFT issued 
'Implementing Rules of Film Production License Qualification System'. The new 
regulations permit the Chinese private capitals to invest in the Chinese film industry and 
have independent film production rights. In addition, they allow Chinese private capital 
to partner with foreign capital, with conditions and terms that the Chinese own the 
majority of the joint venture. Under the guidance of these policies, Beijing New Picture 
Film Corporation and Huayi Bros. Media Group, the two major privately owned film 
companies by the above two tycoons, were authorized as the experimental units that had 
production and co-production licenses. At that point, the state monopoly on film 
production and distribution underwent a significant change. 
2.12 The Reforms on External Policy 
The gradually increasing openness and reforms aimed at marketisation and liberalization 
are initiatives the Chinese state has taken to sustain and develop a healthy market under 
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the pressure of globalization. Meanwhile, in the era of globalization, cultural policies are 
regarded as 'the stage where power struggles are waged on national or international 
level' and 'political instrument that countries use in an attempt to control the types of 
channels and types of content that enter and leave their territory' (Crane, 2002:12). 
Crane (2002) points out that on the international level, when the state draws up 
cultural policies, it should not only make provisions for preserving and protecting its 
own local cultures, but more actively, for transforming the local culture catering for 
global markets, and inviting market competition. She also suggests the national 
governments protect domestic media companies in order to highlight the importance of 
cultural industries in the national economic system. 
With regard to external policies towards foreign penetration, the Chinese 
government first issued 'Provisional Measures for Chinese Film Distribution Exhibition 
Exportation Importation' in 1994. Since November 1994, the mainland Chinese film 
market has been partly open with a quota system and profit-sharing. These measures 
regulated that a quota of 10 foreign feature films annually could be imported for 
distribution, and the quota would be increased with China's access to the WTO. The first 
imported blockbuster was The Fugitive by Warner Bros. Pictures. It was the first time 
China Film Corporation and Warner Bros. Pictures adopted profit-sharing to distribute a 
film in China film market. Of the box-office revenues, 55% were handed in to China 
Film Corporation and Warner Bros. Pictures got 40% (Liu, 2004). It is rare for this 
transnational media conglomerate to profit-sharing the distribution of a Hollywood film 
in other nations of the world. In mainland China, this profit-sharing and importation 
policy on one hand effectively restricts the quantity and profit of foreign films exhibited 
in Chinese cinemas; on the other hand it gives the China Film Corporation exclusive 
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distribution rights of foreign imported films. With this kind of state protection and 
monopoly, China Film Corporation can accumulate experience and capital, which can be 
in return for its film production funds, and in this way, sustain and nurture the Chinese 
film industry. 
In addition, with China's access to the WTO, restrictions on the film industry have 
gradually been relaxed under the increasing pressure for market openness and 
competition. In terms of film production, in 2001 China's Central Propaganda 
Department, SARFT，and the Press and Publications Administration jointly issued new 
reforms concerning publications and audio-visual industries. It affirmed the policy to 
allow private and foreign media capital in the Chinese film industry. In 2003，SARFT 
issued Interim Provisions on the Access of Operational Qualifications for Movie 
Production, Distribution and Projection. The regulations provide administrative rules and 
approval for foreign investment to engage in the film production and exhibition. Under 
the regulations, foreign investors are allowed to establish equity joint ventures or 
cooperative joint ventures with existing state-owned film production companies, as long 
as the foreign investment does not account for more than 49% of the registered capital of 
the joint venture. In the same year, provisional measures for foreign investment on 
cinemas were amended to open up the Chinese cinemas and progressively raise the ratio 
of foreign investment. In the Provisional Regulation on Investment in Cinemas by 
Foreign Investors, it clearly provides that "for the Chinese-foreign equity joint cinemas to 
be established, the share of the investment made by the Chinese party in the registered 
capital shall account for no less than 51%; for the Chinese-foreign equity joint cinemas to 
be established in such pilot cities as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Xi'an, 
Wuhan, and Nanjing, the share of the investment made by the foreign party in the 
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registered capital may not be above 75%".^ At the time it was first released, this 
regulation was revolutionary. It first approved foreign investors to hold the controlling 
interest as it approved the foreign investments up to 75%. Korean Orion Group and 
Loews in America, which is the world's third biggest theatre chains, joint venture with 
New Film Association, which is one of the biggest theatre chains in mainland China with 
China Film Group's inves tmentThese newly built cinemas are 75% owned by foreign 
investment, while Orion and Loews respectively own 37.5%, and 25% of New Film 
Association". Warner Bros, also unveiled its plan to partner with the Shanghai Film 
Group, Dalian Wad an Group, to build its first cinemas in mainland China. As China gave 
free rein to foreign investors in its digital cinema sector in July 2005，Warner Bros, 
accelerated its steps to open more digital cinemas in major China cities. 
Together with the penetration of Hollywood blockbusters on the Chinese film 
market, years of film industry reform pushed Chinese distributors and exhibitors toward 
adopting a "Hollywood-style, vertically integrated marketing and management system" 
(Zhu, 2003:87), which had profound influences on the future development of Chinese 
film industry, and significant implications on this study. The state's further open policy 
to invite the private and foreign media capitals reconstitutes a multi-player collaboration 
and an integration of state capital, Chinese private capital and foreign capital. Two 
significant events demonstrate this attempt. With purposes of restructuring and 
conglomeration of film organizations, the Chinese State Economic and Trade 
Commission authorized eight film studios and companies affiliated to SARFT to found 
the China Film Group Corporation in 1999. This action revealed the state's attempt to 
integrate media resources through this conglomerate, in order to strengthen the film 
production ability, improve the distribution networks and found a competitive modern 
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film group corporation (Liu, 2004). The second one is Warner China Film HG, which is 
the first foreign joint venture film company in mainland China. In October 2004, 
SARFT and the Ministry of Commerce of China issued Interim Provisions on Operation 
Qualification Access for Movie Enterprises (see Appendix 3 for details), to secure the 
formation of Warner China Film HG. The formation of the Company brings together the 
China Film Group, China's leading state-owned filmed entertainment conglomerate; 
Warner Bros. Pictures, a global media conglomerate; and Hengdian Group, China's 
largest privately owned film and television enterprise, respectively holding the company 
stake at the ratio of 4 : 3 : 3 . T h i s integration has significant implications for the 
development and direction of the Chinese film industry. How to sustain and optimize 
this company determines to a certain extent the future of the Chinese film industry (Yin 
and Wang, 2005). 
2.13 Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) 
With the purpose of promoting the joint economic prosperity and development of 
mainland China and Hong Kong, the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement was 
signed in June 2003. It can also be considered as a compliance to WTO terms, but it first 
experimented with Hong Kong companies. At that time, mainland China restricted 
foreign films to a quota system, whereby 20 could be imported annually, and Hong Kong 
films were treated as foreign films. Under CEPA, Chinese language films produced by 
Hong Kong companies can be imported for distribution on a quota-free basis. Due to the 
restricted censorship and quota system, Hong Kong films did not find much market 
access to the mainland Chinese film market. In addition, co-produced films between 
mainland China and Hong Kong are treated as Chinese-made local films under the terms 
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of CEPA. Thus, co-production became a popular route for Hong Kong film production 
companies to access the mainland Chinese film market. 
Tracing back the history of co-production in mainland China, Hong Kong is 
definitely a major player among all the other foreign investors. The early co-production 
between mainland China and Hong Kong can be dated from 1982, with Burning of the 
Imperial Palace and Reign Behind a Curtain'^. Since then, co-production has become 
prevalent. In that period, the purpose of Hong Kong filmmakers' co-producing with 
mainland China was to expand films' subject matters, and to gain access to a cheaper 
place to produce and shoot films, rather than the market consideration as in more recent 
years. Some co-production in the early age was for political purposes, more than 
economic. 
Another wave in co-production in mainland Chinese film industry is in the early 
1990s，which resulted from a series of distribution reforms, and in that period, Hong 
Kong-mainland co-production made up to 84.4% of the total co-productions in the 
mainland Chinese film industry''*. Continued distribution reform in the Chinese film 
industry had brought financial problems to the production studios and companies. The 
shortage of production capital affected not only film quantity but also film quality. As a 
consequence, film production retreated to co-production by 1993, which invited foreign 
capital investment, mainly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, while employing domestic 
talents and facilities. David Held (1999) notes that one of the main manifestations of 
globalization in the film industry has been co-production, where the development of a 
film is funded by money from organizations in more than one nation. The forms of co-
production are many and varied but the goal of co-production is clear, that is, to enlarge 
the source of finance, the market and the potential distribution networks. The Hong Kong 
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film industry had been depressed and deficient in investments for the previous 10 years. 
Hong Kong film industry has long depended mainly on the overseas markets and foreign 
investments, and since the 1990s the overseas markets had been shrinking, which meant 
that the Hong Kong film industry was in dire trouble. Therefore, they shifted their 
attention to the mainland China film market. The trend to co-production continues and 
accelerates under CEPA, for Hong Kong film companies are eager to penetrate the 
mainland Chinese market in order to 'sustain enough market' and 'a healthy industry'.'^ 
Furthermore, regulations on cinema construction in CEPA deeply encourage Hong 
Kong film makers and companies to invest in construction or renovation of cinemas in 
mainland China, which is also an effective way to enter the mainland Chinese film 
market. An earlier phase of CEPA shows that Hong Kong media companies can construct, 
renovate or operate cinemas as long as their majority holding does not exceed 75% in the 
joint venture. Hong Kong film companies, such as Universe International Holdings Ltd., 
Golden Harvest Entertainment Co. Ltd. and StarEast Entertainment Co. Ltd. began to 
target the mainland China market by constructing or operating cinemas, as the policy 
turned favorable for them. In 2005, Supplementary Provisions to the Provisional 
Regulation on Investment in Cinemas by Foreign Investors allowed Hong Kong and 
Macau media companies ‘to construct, rebuild and operate cinemas in the Mainland of 
China through equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures or solely-funded 
enterprises，16. 
In CEPA's third phase, which was effective from January 2006，Hong Kong film 
companies are also allowed total ownership to construct or renovate a cinema in more 
than one city, with minimum capital RMB 10,000,000. In addition, Hong Kong film 
companies can wholly operate their own distribution company to distribute Chinese-
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made films, which is forbidden to other foreign media investors. For example, Hong 
Kong film tycoon, Bill Kong, who is the producer and distributor of Crouching Tiger, 
Hidden Dragon, Hero and the latest Chinese blockbuster Curse of the Golden Flower, 
and his film company EDKO Film Ltd., is now expanding in the mainland Chinese 
market by operating distribution company and buying cinemas. 
2.14 Consequences of and Implicationsfor the Chinese Film Industrial Reforms 
Nowadays, in terms of production in the Chinese film industry, the forms and makings of 
investments have been various, to involve state-owned capital, and private capital 
together with foreign media capitals. The state-owned film production companies and 
privately owned film production companies, along with foreign media investments and 
collaboration, participated in the production of Chinese films. Currently, 187 privately 
owned companies own the film production permit, among which only about 10 
companies are active in film production.” Among those 212 Chinese-made feature films 
in 2004, 30 films were produced by state-owned production companies, 50 films were 
produced by privately owned companies or other media organizations, and 37 films were 
co-produced, while Private capitals and foreign capitals participate in producing over 
80% of these films (Yin and Wang, 2005). In 2005，65 out of 260 Chinese-made feature 
films were produced by state-owned production companies, 96 were by privately owned 
companies or other organizations, 62 films joint produced by state-owned film 
companies and privately owned companies, and 37 films co-produced by state-owned, 
privately owned and foreign media companies (Yin and Wang, 2005). Generally, in 
recent years, private capital and foreign media capitals make up to 75% of the total 
Chinese-made feature films (Yin and Wang, 2005; Yin and Zhan，2006). All these 
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figures demonstrate the increasingly important role of private capital and foreign media 
capital, and the manifest trend towards co-production in the Chinese film production. In 
addition, the first foreign joint venture film company in mainland China, Warner China 
Film HG, which brings together the China Film Group, Warner Bros. Pictures and 
Hengdian Group, and later Sony Pictures TV Int'l and China Film Group's joint venture 
in November 2004 indicate openness in the state policy and an opportunity for the foreign 
media capital. 
Meanwhile, judging from the state media policies and the paths the foreign media 
capitals take into mainland Chinese market, we can see that distribution and exhibition 
are the two most crucial segments in the film industry chain. Therefore, compared to film 
production, the government policies regarding film distribution and exhibition have been 
the last to open, and the extent of openness towards the foreign media capitals is still 
highly restricted. In terms of film distribution in mainland China, there are 31 state-
owned and 10 privately owned companies that have the national distribution rights to 
distribute Chinese-made film. In the exhibition of films, there are about 6000 cinemas 
and 36 theatre chains nowadays in mainland China, among which 1243 cinemas join 
these 36 theatre chains*^. All these theatre chains are state-owned, except for China Film 
Stella Theatre Chain, which is jointly constructed by China Film Group and privately 
owned Stella Megamedia, and Century Universe Theatre Chain, owned by state capital. 
Only 22 cinemas have been constructed or renovated by foreign media investments. 
From the Provisional Regulation on Investment in Cinemas by Foreign Investors, 
effective in 2004, foreign investors began to throw themselves into mainland Chinese 
cinemas. However, when they expected there would be a wider openness in investments 
in the mainland China film industry, in the end of 2006 the special investment policy 
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towards seven pilot cities was withdrawn. Those foreign investors who were allowed to 
hold up to 75% of joint venture so that they could take control of operating the theatre 
chains had to give up part of their shares and hold a share of the investment not more than 
49%. For example, Warner China withdrew their entire share in the joint venture with 
mainland Chinese partners in investing cinemas. Part of Warner's share was purchased by 
China Film Group. This experience indicates that foreign media investors are highly 
subject to the Chinese media policies while the Chinese media policies towards the film 
industry are constantly changing. One more example about private investors is 
production rights in 1995，which were withdrawn by the Chinese government a year later 
and led many films with private investments to withdraw. 
On the other hand, in light of state policy towards the entry into the mainland 
Chinese film market, Hong Kong film companies enjoy more favorable policies than 
other foreign media investors. Moreover, as we observe in recent media policies, there 
seems to be a trend that these preferential rights towards Hong Kong media investors 
will be gradually larger in the future. Such favorable policies are a good sign for those 
Hong Kong filmmakers, and more Hong Kong film companies resort to mainland-Hong 
Kong co-production for a large market. These policy circumstances are the necessary 
condition for the filming of Crazy Stone, the three-partner cooperation and the formation 
of Warner China Film HG. 
2.2 A Glance at the Current Development and Dilemma in the Chinese Film 
Industry 
In 2005, the Chinese film industry toasted 100 years of filmmaking. The year 2005 
marked a third consecutive year of profit for the Chinese film industry'^. The newest 
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Chinese film industry annual report (Yin and Zhan, 2007) points out that the Chinese film 
production in 2006 has exceeded 300，which ranks fourth in the world, after only India, 
America and Japan. Moreover, with a series of favorable policies encouraging Chinese 
private capital and foreign media capital to invest in the Chinese film industry, the 
Chinese film industry is also witnessing a so-called Chinese blockbuster age. 
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Figure 2\ Mainland Chinese Annual Feature Film Production (1990-2006) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tigb/ndtigb/qgndtigb/index.htm 
Since the great triumph of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000) in global 
cinemas, the Chinese film industry seems to have discovered a successful model to enter 
the global market — globalizing Chinese martial arts:� . Following the footsteps of 
Crouching Tiger, the three most prestigious Chinese directors all threw themselves to the 
Chinese martial arts and ancient China, e.g. Zhang Yimou's Hero (2002), House of 
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Flying Daggers (2004) and Curse of the Golden Flower (2006), Chan Kaige's the 
Promise (2005), and Feng Xiaogang's The Banquet (2006). All these 'Chinese 
blockbusters' have investments over RMB 100 million (USD 12.5 million). Though there 
are only 3-5 Chinese blockbusters per year, they occupy nearly 50% of the total Chinese-
made films box-office revenues (Yin and Zhan, 2006). For example, Zhang Yimou's 
Hero, with USD 30 million investments, earned RMB 250 million (USD 32 million) in 
box-office revenue in mainland Chinese cinemas; Chan Kaige's The Promise’ with USD 
42 million investments, earned more than RMB 150 million (USD 19 million) at the box-
office; and Feng Xiaogang's The Banquet, with USD 15 million investments, earned over 
RMB 100 million (USD 12.5 million) at the box-office. Zhang's newest blockbuster, 
Curse of the Golden Flower, which claims to have the highest investment in Chinese 
filmmaking history, will certainly follow the 'golden character' of the Chinese 
blockbusters age. As we can observe in Table 2, these blockbusters cannot make profits 
with merely domestic box-office earnings. Therefore, such high investments have 
decided their route to assort to global market. 
Box-office 
” , , ^ Budget (Domestic 
Director Film Year Genre (US$) Market) 
(US$) 
Zhang Hero 2002 Action/Drama 30 million 32 million 
Yimou (Ancient China ) 
House of 2004 Action/Drama 12,5 million 20 million 
Flying (Ancient China) 
Daggers 
Curse of the 2006 Action/Drama 45 million 40 million 
Golden (Ancient China) 
Flower 
Chan The Promise 2005 Action/Drama 42 million 19 million 
Kaige (Ancient China ) 
Feng The Banquet 2006 Action/Drama 15 million 12.5 million 
Xiaogang (Ancient China ) 
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Table 2\ Chinese Blockbusters in Recent Years 
Source: The Internet Movie Database (IMDb) ( http://www.imdb.com ). 
With the great contribution by these Chinese blockbusters in recent years, the 
annual box-office has increased by over 20% for four successive years from 2003，which 
marks a consecutive success that the Chinese film industry has made. However, the 
amount of annual film production and only a few Chinese blockbusters per year cannot 
indicate prosperity in the Chinese film industry. The seeming prosperity of the Chinese 
film industry and 'Chinese blockbuster age' are produced and sustained by a few 
blockbusters a year, which conceal the reality that the total generation profit of the 
Chinese film industry is low and many films cannot get a cinematic release. Though the 
annual box-office has increased by 20% for successive four years, the mainland Chinese 
domestic box-office is only RMB 2.5 billion (USD 0.32 billion) and the total profit 
generated bythe Chinese film industry is a mere RMB 3,6 billion, only 0.6% of that of 
Hollywood, which has an annual profit of over USD 60 billion (Yin and Wang, 2005). 
These few Chinese blockbusters have always taken up to 10-20% of the annual box-
office and nearly half of the box-office of the Chinese-made films. The rest of the annual 
productions, especially those with a low budget less than RMB 3 million (USD 0.4 
million) are usually in a predicament. Though in 2005 the mainland Chinese film industry 
has churned out 260 feature films, an increase of 48 over 2004，only one-third of all 
Chinese films can get a cinematic release. The remaining two-thirds can only get video 
distribution. This two-thirds of film productions is always referring to the low-budget 
films. In the current Chinese film industry, 85% of the Chinese films are budgeted 
between RMB 1.5-3 million (USD 0.2-0.4 million), which accounts for about 200 
Chinese films in both 2005 and 2006 (Yin and Zhan, 2006, 2007). Of this proportion of 
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Chinese films, few get cinematic release and some of them cannot even gain access to 
market. Even when they get cinematic release, the prospect of their box-office earnings is 
usually gloomy. A few of these low-budget films resort to ‘a tortuous route', that is, going 
first to international film festivals and, with the international awards, then going back to 
the domestic market and attempting to get a cinematic release. For example, Scmxia 
Haoren by Jia Zhangke was recently awarded the 'Golden Lion', the highest honor in 
Venice Film Festival, in 2006,，but this award-winning film was long censored before it 
finally got a cinematic release. Moreover, the film's box-office earnings ended up with 
only RMB 0.4 million.^' Though some low-budget Chinese films have attempted to tailor 
their films to suit the taste of the state's censorship and the market, e.g. Zhang Yuan's 
Green Tea, they received little market response and low box-office. Among these films 
with less than RMB 3 million (USD 0.4 million) investments, 60% made a loss^^. 
Medium-budget films are facing the same predicament (interview with Qu Yue, March 
30th，2007). While the Chinese blockbusters are prevalent and popular in the market, 
many filmmakers regard 'intensive investment' as a 'necessity' in film production, e.g., 
Wang Zhongjun, the CEO of Huayi Brother Media Group, producer of Feng Xiaogang's 
films, indicated the attractiveness of ‘big films' (blockbusters) among the audiences^^. 
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Figure 3\ Mainland Chinese Annual Domestic Box-office (1998-2006) 
Source: 2006 Chinese Film Industry Report, at 
http://www.esunc.eom/Files/zxpd/XSYJ/book/ndbg2006/ndbg2006-dvcv.doc and 
2007 Chinese Film industry Report, at 
http://www.china.com.cn/culture/txt/2007-02/27/content 7876144.htm 
Such a 'big films' notion to a certain extent restrains the space for low-budget films. 
Even for those films that successfully fight for a cinematic release, theatre chains and 
cinemas are reluctant to arrange substantial screenings for their exhibition. During shows 
of the Chinese blockbusters, almost all the screenings and cinemas are dedicated to these 
blockbusters. This unbalanced proportion of the film market induces another dilemma in 
the Chinese film industry, people's habit of not going to the cinema. The homogenous 
film genres probably hinder, rather than cultivate, the likelihood of people going to the 
cinema. Chinese audiences' annual average spending on films is only RMB 0.8 (USD 0.1) 
annually; they go to the cinema once every 5 years, while American audiences watch 5.7 
films per year24. 
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Frequency of going to cinemas Male (%) Female (%) 
Once every week 0.6 0.2 
2-3 times every month 2.9 1.8 
Once every month 4.3 4.2 
once every 2-3months 9.3 6.7 
Once every 6 months 13 13.3 
Once a year or less 6 5.7 
Never M ^ 
Table 3\ Mainland Chinese audience's Frequency of Going-to -cinemas 
Source: Cinemas, Film Production & Distribution in CHINA & HONG KONG: A 
Market Analysis ACCESS Asia Limited, 2004. 
In the 1980s, the Chinese film industry had witnessed the prosperity of its age. 
People had the habit of going to cinema and the cinemas were always full. Annual box-
offices in that period of time reached RMB 2 billion (USD 0.25 billion), which is similar 
to the earnings of the current Chinese film industry. However, after the 'golden age，of 
the film market, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the annual box-office dropped down to 
about RMB 1 billion (USD 0.125 billion), only half of that in the 1980s. One point that 
should be definitely noted is that the ticket price has increased several times during those 
ten years. That is to say, the amount of film audiences has decreased by almost 
The reasons for their not going to the cinema are many. For example, the relatively high 
ticket fare, the lack of cinemas and screens. However, the most fundamental one, in my 
opinion, is the deficiency of providing films that cater to the mass audiences' tastes and 
fit in with the market as well. Nowadays in the mainland Chinese film market, only a few 
mainland Chinese directors have great market appeals, e.g. Zhang Yimou, Chan Kaige 
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and Feng Xiao gang. When all of these directors are keen to throw themselves into making 
Chinese blockbusters that are all set in ancient China and focus on martial arts, and enter 
the global market attracting huge amount of foreign capital investments, the Chinese film 
industry requires more talents to make films with various themes and genres to sustain a 
healthy and sufficient domestic market. 
Crazy Stone emerged from the above industrial background and dilemma. I would 
like to refer it as emerging from a crack — a crack between the state's relaxed or 
tightened policy, between the state control and the penetration of foreign media capital, 
between the Hollywood blockbusters and the go-global mainland Chinese blockbusters. 
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Chapter 3. Research Questions and Methodology 
3.1 Analytical Framework 
Based on above literatures and the specific situation in mainland Chinese film industry 
nowadays, the following framework will be adopted to analyze localization of the foreign 
media capital in the Chinese film industry, in the case of Crazy Stone. 
(Foreign media capital) Global Context 
Localization 
Policy' 
Local Film Industry 
State/State-owned Privately owned 
media companies media companies 
W 
-Localization of the creative Regional 
-Localization of the content (text) 
-Localization of the economic 
-Localization of the marketing strategies 
Policy t 
(Foreign meflia capital) 
Figure 4: Analytical Framework 
The site of this study is a local film industry — the Chinese film industry, which 
locates in a global context. In the age of globalization, foreign media investors begin their 
to enter this huge media market. However, the mainland Chinese film market does not 
operate in a pure market economy. The Chinese government controls the market by 
administrative means, e.g., media policies, to make the Chinese film market a relatively 
closed one, which highly restricts the access of foreign investors. Great tension exists 
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between the market and the state control in this closed market environment. Therefore， 
when the foreign media investors attempt to enter the Chinese market, they are subject to 
and must negotiate with the Chinese media policies. In this analytical framework, I put 
forth localization as the strategy that foreign media investors take to overcome the 
Chinese policy obstacles. The above literature shows that when the transnational media 
corporations come across authoritarian political regimes, a 'media-political complex' 
(Curran and Park, 2000:14), a 'state-market complex' (Ma, 2000:32), or a 'state-global 
media complex' (Fung, 2006) is formed. In this case, it shows a more complicated and 
interactive negotiation with the nation-state, for it has performed a triangular interaction 
among the complex power relations, state control, the rising Chinese private capital and 
global capitalism. Therefore, in the analytical framework, state-owned and private media 
capitals are also invited to depict a clearer picture of the current mainland Chinese film 
industry. The state-owned media companies and the privately owned media companies 
are the two main existing players in the Chinese film industry. As part of the foreign 
investors' localization strategy, they would be a joint partnership with the local 
filmmakers, i.e., the state-owned companies or the privately owned companies, in order 
to facilitate their steps into the market. 
Therefore, I use 'foreign media capital' in my analytical framework to cover a full 
view of the foreign involvement in the mainland Chinese film industry. 'Foreign', which 
contrasts with local in this specific case, is employed to capture the two levels of contexts 
that the local film industry is located in, which are regional and global. In other word, the 
use of 'foreign' in this term includes both Hong Kong and transnational investors, as this 
is what the mainland Chinese government defines as 'outside mainland China'. Thus, in 
this study, the 'foreign media capital' comes from both a regional and a global context. 
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'Capital' in this study has two levels of meaning. One is used in a narrow sense, to 
indicate the economic capital and investment; the other is used in a broad sense, which 
bears the economic capital as well as the social capital, the power, the competitive 
capability, management, talents and human resources, etc. In the concept of 'foreign 
media capital' in this case, it employs the second level of indication, which refers to not 
only the economic capital as money, but also, for example, the foreign business operation 
methods and management models that it brings in, and their power in negotiating with the 
Chinese government. This ‘foreign media capital' meanwhile represents a strategic and 
flinctional formation of both levels of capital. Hence, 'foreign media capital' is a concept 
that reflects this strategic and functional formation of capital, and captures the whole 
process of localization. 
Based on my case study, Crazy Stone, I divide this process of localization of the 
foreign media capital into four aspects, that is, localization of the creative, localization of 
the content and text, the localization of the economic, and the localization of marketing 
strategies. In my study, the creative indicates the creative production team and cast in the 
film. Localization of the creative will be examined in terms of how many local staff are 
involved in the film production process，and the extent of local participation in the film 
creativity. Secondly, the content refers to the storyline and dialogue in the film. The 
localization of the content will be examined in the light of the local elements within the 
film. Thirdly, the economic refers to the economic capital，the investment that foreign 
media investors make in the Chinese film industry. Localization of the economic will 
mainly examine the local involvement of this foreign economic capital and investment, 
e.g. their joint venture with local partners, and how the foreign investors employ their 
local partners' advantage to facilitate their localization. Lastly, localization of marketing 
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strategies will explore the strategies that the film makes to specially adapt to the local 
market. One point should be noted: localization of foreign media capital is an integral 
whole, of which four aspects are reflections and outcomes of that integral whole, and are 
not mutually exclusive but highly correlated to each other. For example, when I examine 
the localization of the economic, localization of the working staff and creative staff is an 
important consequence. Similarly, localization of the creative production team will in 
return contribute a lot to the localization of the film content. Hence, the division of these 
four aspects is for the sake of analysis; it does not implicate a mutually exclusive 
relationship between these four aspects. 
Furthermore, there is one more layer that local film industry is located in, which is 
a regional context. As we have discussed in the trajectory of the mainland Chinese media 
policy reform, Hong Kong, a regional film player, constantly enjoys preferential rights 
over other foreign media investors. Thus, in the analytical framework, the dotted line 
represents the policies towards Hong Kong media investors, which indicates a relatively 
open policy; while the solid line represents the policies towards other foreign media 
investors, which always restrict their entry into mainland Chinese film market. I will also 
discuss the attempt of the mainland Chinese government to partner with the Hong Kong 
filmmakers to form a regional film industry. Thus, a three-layer framework is formed to 
make analysis on the localization of the foreign media capital into the mainland Chinese 
film industry and the interaction with the state and private media capital. 
3.2 Research Questions 
The following research questions are raised in the light of the four aspects and the 
relations between the three partners represented in the analytical framework. 
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1. How are the foreign media capital localized in Chinese film industry? 
la. How was the foreign media capital localized in terms of the creative? 
lb. How was the foreign media capital localized in terms of the content? 
Ic. How was the foreign media capital localized in terms of the economic? 
Id. How was the foreign media capital localized in terms of marketing strategies? 
Besides these four questions, during my analysis, I will also examine the following 
question: 
2. How do the power relations between Chinese state control, emerging Chinese private 
capital and foreign media capital interplay in the localization process of the foreign 
media capital? 
This study will use Crazy Stone as a case study to illustrate and investigate the above 
research questions. 
3.3 Methodology 
Approaching from a political economy perspective, to make a critical analysis on the case 
of Crazy Stone, I mainly rely on four methods. Data collection first took place between 
June 2006 and April 2007 when I interned in Focus Films Ltd. Hong Kong, one of the 
production companies of Crazy Stone. 
1. Production analysis. Production and political economic analysis focuses on media 
ownership, the process by which the cultural products are produced, and the 
organizational and social structure. The way cultural products are produced affects 
their nature and content. In my case study, Crazy Stone, the preparation and 
production period began from March 2005, when the director Ning Hao was selected 
by the regional film project, FOCUS: First Cuts, to April 2006 when the post-
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production of Crazy Stone was finished. Since I started this research and data 
collection in June 2006，which exceeds the film's production period, here in this study 
I could not access to the production site and observe the production of the film. 
However, as production is a very important site to reveal the negotiation, the tension 
and the relations between different players, this study will keep a keen eye on the 
production process that involved a chain of decision making and cooperation of 
creative teamwork, as well as the role of the capitalist mechanism in financing, 
marketing and distribution. For example, how the three partners initiated their 
cooperation in Crazy Stone and in Warner China Film HG; what investment mode of 
Crazy Stone is; and the process they created this film, etc. These data will be 
collected by interviews with the practitioners and media reports. 
2. Participant observation. I interned in Focus Films Ltd. Hong Kong during Crazy 
Stone's marketing promotion and general release period in mainland China and Hong 
Kong from June to August Focus Films Ltd is helmed by an Asian star, Andy 
Lau. He is a popular singer, actor and award-winning superstar in Hong Kong and 
across the region. Established in 2003, Andy Lau and his company have long been 
passionate and dedicated to nurturing new filmmakers and giving them support to 
realize their vision. FOCUS: First Cuts is the very project aimed at such motivations, 
FOCUS: First Cuts, for the first time in Asia, is a regional film project launched in 
March 2005, in which six Chinese-language feature films are produced by a group of 
new and upcoming directors from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and 
mainland China. Ning Hao was selected to be the mainland Chinese director in this 
film project. During this three months period, I served in the marketing and 
distribution department, which coordinates the marketing and distribution of the films. 
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These three months were a crucial period for Crazy Stone, since its marketing 
promotion was commenced in early June and its cinematic release was held for two 
months during July and August. Focus Films Ltd, as the holder of copyright of Crazy 
Stone, always worked as a coordinator between the other two partners. For example, 
after the post-production of Crazy Stone, the film's copy for cinematic show was sent 
by Focus Films Ltd in Hong Kong to Warner China HG in Beijing. As a small 
company, there were only six people (including me) in the marketing and distribution 
department of Focus Films Ltd. Such a working environment facilitated my research 
observation, for I could access and handle some main issues, and observe what other 
colleagues did. In addition, these environments helped me to easily make friends with 
my colleagues. We usually had casual discussions during lunch times and I could also 
refer questions about the company and the film to them during and after my 
internship. The participant observation mainly answered the questions about the role 
of Focus Films in the co-production, how the negotiation and coordination made 
between the cooperative partners and, from a foreign investor's perspective, the pros 
and cons of making a co-production. 
3. Interviews. I interviewed some managers in China Film Group, China Film Co-
production Corporation, Warner China Film HG and Hengdian Group, and other 
practitioners in the Chinese film industry. These interviews represented and revealed 
opinions from three players all in the newly reconstituted power bloc, the Chinese 
state, the emerging private capital and the foreign media capital. In addition, through 
these interviews, I can grasp some ideas about the production process of the film, 
their negotiation or compromise, and their power relations in the process of localizing 
foreign media capital. To supplement, some film reviews, critics, and published 
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interviews and documents will also be adopted for the analysis. In addition, the 
mainland Chinese film industry reports and the Chinese film annual reports in the 
recent years will be complemented as the background and industrial development. 
Interviewees are listed in the below table. 
Affiliation Title Name 
Warner China Film HG Vice President Hu Min 
Manager, Distribution 
China Film Group Geng Xilin 
Department 
Hengdian Group Director, News Centre Shi Weidong 
China Film Co-production 
Vice President Miao Xiaotian 
Corporation 
Beijing Polybona Film 
Ex-assistant of CEO Qu Yue 
Distribution Company 
Ex-manager, Marketing 
Focus Films Ltd. Hong Kong Lorna Tee 
and Distribution 
Table 4'. Interviewees 
4. Textual analysis. As I divide the localization of the foreign media capital in terms of 
creative, content, economic and marketing strategies, textual analysis is adopted to 
support my argument about the localization of cultural content. Moreover, it also 
supplements the production analysis, which believes that the process by which 
cultural products are produced will affect their content. Thus, the storyline and typical 
dialogues of Crazy Stone will be analyzed to find out the local elements or values in 
the film. Here in the study, I define the local elements or values in two terms. The first 
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is 'everyman's life', which represents ordinary Chinese people's daily life and can 
make resonance between the audiences; the second is local representation and re-
invention of global elements. In the light of these two terms, the storylines and 
dialogues such as a series of contemporary issues in modern mainland China, a Coca-
cola fraud, a BMW colliding with an old and shabby van, people indulged in mobile 
phone SMS, and the clever reframing of some foreign film shots, e.g., Mission 
Impossible, Batman�etc. will be taken into textual analysis. 
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Chapter 4. The Analysis of Localization of the Foreign Media Capital in 
Crazy Stone 
Based on the above theoretical and industrial background, and the analytical framework, 
the following part will analyze the successful strategies of localization of foreign media 
capitals in the case Crazy Stone, in terms of the creative, content, economic and 
marketing strategies. Such localization strategies have two consequences. One is the 
localization of foreign media capital into a local cultural product, that is, Crazy Stone, and 
the other is, above all, the localization of foreign media capital in its production and 
distribution company, Warner China Film HG. Prior to investigating the localization 
strategies, the following section will first look at the trajectory of the foreign media 
corporations into the mainland China market. 
Mainland China has long been presenting a closed market environment which 
highly restricts the foreigner to access. However, as the mainland China market exhibits 
great potential in the foreign investors' eyes, they have been striving for a long time to 
penetrate this huge market with one-fifth of the world's population. Nevertheless, even 
after China has gradually opened the media market, as previously discussed with regard 
to the media reforms in mainland China, the opportunities for foreign media corporations' 
to penetrate the market are still highly subject to the relaxed or tightened media policies 
of the Chinese government. For more than a decade, keen foreign investors have been 
seeking every opportunity to share the huge potential profits in this market, e.g., the 
profit-sharing of imported Hollywood blockbusters, which is rare in other markets for 
Hollywood corporations. It is worth examining the steps and persistent attempts of 
Warner Bros, to adjust to different state policies in different periods, as the producer of 
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the first imported profit-sharing blockbuster in PRC and the first joint partner with 
mainland China forming a China-foreign joint venture film company Warner China Film 
HG. Thus, this part will begin with an overview of the historical trajectory of Warner 
Bros, entering the mainland China market and the evolution of collaboration modes 
before it finally gained the first admission ticket to a joint venture in the Chinese film 
production company. 
4.1 Trajectory of Warner Bros. Entering Mainland China Market 
Foreign media majors play a key role in direct distribution through their branches in local 
countries, while in some cases they invest in production, distribution and exhibition. 
These transnational media majors formed strategic alliances with local capital; in the 
meantime, local government and companies were keen to take this opportunity to get 
involved in the global media market to integrate the domestic media industries into the 
global media system (Dal, 2006; Wu & Chan，2007). The local's increasing integration 
with the global greatly facilitates the entry of global media corporations, as well as 
promotes the local's access to the global media market. 
Time Warner is one company that maintained a continuous endeavor to expand in 
overseas markets. After Time Inc. and Warner Communications completed a corporate 
merger, Time Warner became the largest media conglomerate in the world. As Time 
Warner's first annual report described in its reasons for merging, no serious competitor 
could hope for any long-term success unless, building on a secure home base, they 
achieved a major presence in all of the world's important markets.26 The merger 
agreement has enabled Time Warner to compete with the other majors, such as 
NewsCorp. Ltd. and facilitated its ambitious steps especially in the global market. It 
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called for a plan to forge massive alliances in Europe and Asia as a way to enter these 
markets. This plan suggested that the local partners invest in 'a limited partnership' so as 
to gain an equity stake in Time Warner's assets (Richard, 1997:147). With this kind of 
strategic alliance and partnership, Time Warner gained greater access to local markets. In 
the early 1990s，Time Warner's international sales accounted for 40% of the company's 
total revenues (Richard, 1997). 
Regarding the mainland China market, Warner Bros, first successfully entered the 
mainland Chinese film market with its blockbuster The Fugitive in November 1994 with 
a profit-sharing mode, in which 55% of profits were handed in to China Film Corporation 
and Warner got 40% (Liu, 2004). Since then, Warner has regarded mainland China as an 
important market in its global expansion strategy and has actively built networks in 
mainland China with the Chinese government. Before the formation of Warner China 
Film HG in the end of 2004, Warner Bros, had been striving and seeking opportunities to 
participate in Chinese film production and distribution for eight years. In the eyes of the 
transnational media corporations, only if they enter a joint venture or hold the controlling 
interest can they really enjoy the profits of this huge market (interview with Hu Min, 
April 4th，2007). Thus, after China's access to the WTO, these transnational media 
corporations exerted greater pressure on the Chinese government to open its market. In 
2003, the Chinese government first opens its cinema construction to foreign media 
investment. Warner became one of those first corporations to benefit from the new 
policies. 
Film distribution and exhibition in the mainland China film market are the two 
areas that foreign media capitals are keen to strive into. Film distribution is the centre that 
links up with film production and exhibition. In mainland China nowadays, the 
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deficiency of cinemas has become a main bottleneck that restricts the development of the 
Chinese film industry. In USA, there is one film screen per 8.6 thousand people, while in 
mainland China there is only one screen per 120 thousand people, and 0.5 billion people 
in urban cities share about 3000 cinemas.�？ The 36 theatre chains own 1243 cinema 
complexes and 2668 screens, which indicates less than 40 cinemas in a theatre chain and 
only 2 screens in one cinema complex; furthermore, the top 34 cinemas, ranked by box-
office, occupy up to half of the total domestic box-office in 2006.28 Due to the 
insufficiency of capital, the construction or renovation of cinemas is hard to carry out. 
Under such circumstances, it is especially important to bring in foreign media capital in 
investing the constructing or renovating the Chinese cinemas. In late 2003，SARFT 
gradually opened its film exhibition market to foreign investors. In the Provisional 
Regulation on Investment in Cinemas by Foreign Investors, it clearly states that "for the 
Chinese-foreign equity joint cinemas to be established, the share of the investment made 
by the Chinese party in the registered capital shall account for no less than 51%; for the 
Chinese-foreign equity joint cinemas to be established in such pilot cities as Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Xi'an, Wuhan, and Nanjing, the share of the investment 
made by the foreign party in the registered capital may not be above 75%’，.29 It first 
approved foreign investors to hold the controlling interest as it approved the foreign 
investments up to 75%. Warner and Dalian Wanda Group seized this great opportunity to 
construct their first joint venture cinema, and Warner held the controlling interest in the 
cinemas. 
Nevertheless, the real intention of the foreign investors to invest in Chinese 
cinemas does not simply lie in the cinemas themselves. The previous cooperation 
between mainland Chinese and foreign film companies always focused on the short-term 
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project, e.g., film production and distribution, which would end after the film's life cycle. 
Compared to film production and distribution, the investment in film exhibition is a 
long-term investment, and controlling the film exhibition can have power in negotiation 
with film production and distribution. 
Among those foreign investors in construction or renovation of Chinese cinemas, 
Warner Bros takes the most initiative. Just after the policy came into effect, Warner 
negotiated with several partners across mainland China for its intention to join the 
Chinese cinemas. On July 12th 2003, Warner Bros and the Shanghai Paradise Cinema 
City, the No.l box-office theatre chain in mainland China, established the first Chinese-
foreign joint venture cinema. The Shanghai Paradise and Warner respectively held 51% 
and 49% of the venture. In October, Warner signed an agreement on strategic cooperation 
with Shanghai Film Group, and the agreement clearly stated that these two partners 
would co-construct 10 cinemas under the name Shanghai Warner Cinema, which would 
join the theatre chain owned by the Shanghai Film Group. The total investment would be 
RMB 0.3 billion, and Warner would gain the controlling interest for two of those cinemas, 
with a 51% controlling stake. It implicated a substantial breakthrough for the foreign 
media capital in investing the Chinese cinemas. In the meantime, Warner also had a plan 
to construct cinemas in Guangzhou, with the cooperation of the Guangzhou Film 
Company. In January 2004, Warner and Dalian Wanda Group signed the cooperation 
agreement on investment in cinemas. They had a plan to expand their Warner Wanda 
Cinema in 30 cities across mainland China, and the first cities to enter included Tianjin, 
Dalian, Shenyang and Hanghzou.^® 
From the strategic vision of Warner Bros investing in Chinese cinemas, we can 
sense the possibility that if the policies towards foreign media capital in the Chinese film 
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exhibition become more open, foreign investors will soon establish their own cinema 
chains in mainland China. These transnational media conglomerates hold a greater 
advantage over the mainland Chinese cinemas for their capacity to get Hollywood 
blockbusters, as these blockbusters are produced by them. For example, when Matrix 3, 
which was produced by Warner Bros, was first on show in Shanghai, the joint venture 
cinema by Warner Bros and Shanghai Film Group exhibited the film earlier than other 
cinemas in Shanghai. 
Furthermore, for a completely vertically integrated system, Warner would like to 
also be involved in the Chinese film production and distribution, so as to accomplish the 
integration of production, distribution and exhibition. In the end of 2004, the first 
Chinese-foreign joint film company, Warner China Film HG was established. Its business 
covers film production and distribution, and fulfilled Warner's ambition for a complete 
industrial chain. When Warner was moving seemingly smoothly into the mainland 
Chinese film market, the Chinese withdrew the controlling interest and majority of stake 
held by foreign investors in 2006, and Warner decided to withdraw its entire investment 
in Chinese cinemas. 
4.2 Investment Mode of Cra^ Stone 
According to the current scale of Chinese-made film production, the annual investment in 
production in the past two years is around RMB 1.5 to 2 billion, and the financing and 
investment mode to raise this capital has become diverse and various. Besides expanding 
the financing channels, new investment modes have been adopted in the mainland 
Chinese film industry. For example, film festivals have become one of the most favorable 
ways to raise investments, and the Hong Kong International Film Festival and Hong 
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Kong Asia Film Financing Forum have become among the most important and influential 
film festivals and film financing forums in Asia to raise and encourage investment. Apart 
from this kind of film festival and financing forum, film projects becomes another mode 
of investment. 
Crazy Stone is a part of a regional film project, FOCUS: First Cuts by Focus Films 
Ltd. (Hong Kong). Launched in March 2005, this regional project includes six Chinese-
language feature films, with the purpose of offering a stage for those new talented film 
directors. Focus Films Ltd. (Hong Kong) invested a total of HK$ 25 million (USD 3 
million) in this project and it required each of these film productions to be shot in their 
home country or region, using a local cast and production team. This was a mutual 
selection process, for the interested directors chose this film project and this project also 
chose those with investment potential and worth.. After FOCUS: First Cuts was 
announced, it received high recognition and many young directors sent their film scripts 
to Focus Films Ltd (Hong Kong). Except for the mainland China director who was still 
being searched for, the other five local directors and films scripts had soon been decided. 
These selected directors had shown potential and cutting edge vision previously in film 
making in some film festivals that had hit the local market. 
As the search for the mainland Chinese director was still on, Warner Bros. Hong 
Kong, which has a good connection and relationship with Focus Films Ltd (Hong Kong), 
recommended a young and little-known director, Ning Hao to Focus Films. At that time, 
Ning Hao was in the Hong Kong International Film Festival and exhibited his films in 
film mart, looking for investors, when Focus Films found him and showed an interest in 
his film. Actually, things should be traced back to 2004 when Ning Hao was making his 
second feature film, Mongolian Pingpong. The Managing Director of Warner Bros. 
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China, Ellen Eliasoph, who is also Vice President of the newly established Warner China 
Film HG, watched this film in Ning's studio and appreciated his talent. Therefore, when 
the film project especially for new and promising directors was announced, Warner China 
Film HG, was seeking its first attempt in the mainland Chinese film market, while Focus 
Films Ltd (Hong Kong) was in need of a film distributor, she recommended Ning to 
FOCUS: First Cuts. 
A graduate from the Beijing Film Academy, Ning always carried an aspiration for 
filmmaking. His first feature film, Incense, premiered at Locarno, won the Grand Prize at 
Tokyo Filmex, and went on to win the Gold Prize in the Asian DV Competition at Hong 
Kong IFF. This film was also awarded Best Film of 2004 by HK Arts Centre, and was 
shown in the official selection at seven other international festivals, namely San Sebastian, 
Vancouver, Munich, Vienna, Sydney, California and Taiwan South Film Festival (source: 
Focus Films Ltd.). His second feature film Mongolian Pingpong, the one which attracted 
Eliasoph's attention, was produced in 2004 and was selected for the Berlin International 
Forum and the Hong Kong IFF, and was in competition in the Shanghai IFF under the 
Asian Section. However, these international honors and awards did not bring good luck to 
both of his feature films in the mainland China market; neither film could get a cinematic 
release in the domestic cinemas. FOCUS: First Cuts and his Crazy Stone was Ning's first 
attempt to cater to the audiences and return to the domestic cinemas. 
Meanwhile, Focus Films were pleased to co-produce with a mainland Chinese film 
company and produce a Chinese film, in the words of its ex-manager of Marketing and 
Distribution, Lorna Tee, since the mainland Chinese film market is huge enough to 
sustain a small film company as Focus Films. FOCUS: First Cuts gave full freedom to the 
selected directors in their creative ideas and film scripts. Focus Films Ltd. (Hong Kong) 
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is responsible, to some extent, for only a limited budget for funding. Therefore, with this 
budget, Ning adjusted his plan and adopted a lower cost film script instead of the pre-
selected one. And that is how Crazy Stone was born. As the only film proposed in 
mainland China in this project, Crazy Stone was produced by a mainland China local 
privately owned film production company, Concord Creation Int'I Beijing Co., Ltd. For 
Focus Films Ltd. (Hong Kong), this production mode was also favorable, since this 
cooperation makes the film a co-production between Hong Kong and mainland China. As 
the policies mentioned above, Hong Kong films were treated as foreign films when 
imported to the mainland China cinema and subject to the quota system of 20 foreign 
films per year. After CEPA came into effect, Hong Kong Chinese language films were 
exempted from 'foreign films' restriction and could be imported in mainland China on a 
quota-free basis. However, a Hong Kong film cannot easily find a distributor for the 
mainland film market without cooperating with a local partner. A way to tap into the 
mainland Chinese film market more smoothly is via co-production with mainland 
Chinese filmmakers, since co-production can enjoy the preferential treatment shown to a 
mainland Chinese-made local film. That way it can can enjoy a quota-free basis and have 
relatively fewer restrictions and a shorter time for censorship procedure, so that the film 
can get into cinematic release earlier. Hence, co-production also facilitates the film 
distribution in the mainland China market. 
Therefore, a strategic and functional capital formation, which constitutes in the 
light of division of cultural labor, was formed. Each partner functioned in terms of their 
own strengths to contribute to the production, distribution and exhibition of Crazy Stone. 
Focus Films Ltd. (Hong Kong) invested in this film with a budget of money and Concord 
Creation Int'I Beijing Co., Ltd joined the investment in the form of providing a 
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production team and facilities, while Warner China Film HG joined the investment by 
acquiring the mainland China distribution rights to Crazy Stone from Focus Films Ltd. 
(Hong Kong) for RMB 1.4 million. By different modes of investment, each of them 
invested in this film production with a proportion of about 1:1:1. Thus, these three 
companies Focus Films Ltd. (Hong Kong), Concord Creation Int'l Beijing Co., Ltd. and 
Warner China Film HG joined together to produce Crazy Stone. Though apparently these 
three partners evenly invested in the film, in this case ownership and power is not directly 
correlated. As previously pointed out, the media capital does not merely indicate the 
economic capital. Thus, their even investment in terms of economic capital does not 
imply an even power relation between these three partners. Warner China Film HG, 
which is constituted by the state, the Chinese private and foreign capital, exhibits the 
strongest power bloc. Also, Warner China Film HG's strongest power in the industry can 
be interpreted in the light of the film industrial chain. 
In the Chinese film industry nowadays, a profit-sharing mode on box-office 
earnings is adopted. This profit-sharing covers the production company, distribution 
company, and exhibition which is the cinemas or theatre chains and the mainland China 
Film Foundation. The sharing proportion is usually that the production company gets 
30% of the profit; the distribution company gets 15%; cinemas or theatre chains gets 
50%; and the national film foundation, the China Film Foundation, gets 5% (interview 
with Qu Yue, March 30"^  2007). The current film industrial chain can be exhibited in the 
following diagram: 
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Figure 5\ Film Industrial Chain 
In this figure, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 indicates the channels of financing and investments; 1，， 
2’’ 3’，4’ indicates profit returns. As this diagram shows, there are 5 phases for a film 
industry chain, from investment planning to profit returns. The first phase is investment 
planning, which involves inviting investors to join the project. Phase two is production, 
which involves production script, production team and creative. The third phase is 
distribution and marketing, and the fourth is exhibition in cinemas or theatre chains. The 
last phase is post-film-exhibition product development and the returns on investment.^i 
Therefore, we can know that a vertically-integrated system is definitely most 
advantageous in profit-sharing and market competition. 
While some companies upgraded international operations to a privileged position 
by expanding 'horizontally' to tap emerging markets worldwide, by expanding 
'vertically' to form alliances with independent producers to enlarge their rosters, and by 
'partnering' with foreign investors to secure new sources of financing (Balio, 1998)，in 
this case we can also observe a strategic alliance between foreign investors and local 
partners together with the state-owned company to form a vertically-integrated system 
which covers all parts in the film industrial chains. 
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Furthermore, in the mainland Chinese film industry currently, filmmaking is still a 
big investment and big risk industry. Only a small proportion of films can make a balance 
between investment and returns. However, to retrieve the cost is not difficult for a low-
budget film, under RMB 3 million investments, if there is foreign investment 
involvement, (interview with Qu Yue, March 31 访，2007). Meanwhile, the financing and 
investment mode of Crazy Stone shared the risk to all the three production companies 
and secured at least a balance on investment. Warner China Film HG holds the 
distribution rights in mainland China, including cinematic release, online video-on-
demand or download, and video release, excluding subscription television, cable 
television and video-on-demand in Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and mainland China. 
Focus Films Ltd. (Hong Kong) possesses the overseas distribution rights and the 
copyright of the film. Before the film project was launched, Focus Films Ltd had 
partnered with STAR Chinese Movies Network Hong Kong for all their six films' 
exclusive TV premiere in Hong Kong market. Hence, Focus Films had achieved a 
balance for its investment by this deal. When it sold the exclusive distribution right of 
Crazy Stone for Warner China Film HG in the mainland China market, Focus would not 
account much for the film in the mainland market. Thus, Warner China Film HG is 
responsible for distribution and marketing of the film，while Concord Creation Int'l 
Beijing Co., Ltd. is only responsible for the production of the film, and Focus Films Ltd. 
only invests with a budget and makes some coordination with the other two partners. 
Therefore, according to the above graph, we can observe that Focus Films Ltd. and 
Concord Creation Int'l Beijing Co., Ltd. are limited to the first two phases of investment 
and production, while Warner China Film HG covers all the five phases in the chain with 
its cinemas and theatre chains owned or joint venture by Warner Bros, at that time, the 
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China Film Group and the Hengdian Group. Thus, we can know that Warner China Film 
HG is the biggest profit winner in the success of Crazy Stone in the mainland Chinese 
film market. Actually, in the contract they signed about the profit-sharing of Crazy 
Stone's box-office, Warner China Film HG would get the majority of the share of the 
box-office, while Focus Films Ltd. would only get a limited bonus if Crazy Stone's box-
office exceeded RMB 10 million. 
4.3 Successful Strategies Contributing to the Success of Crazy Stone 
As previous discussion has pointed out, the mainland Chinese media policies towards the 
foreign media investors are still relatively restricted. The only way that the policies allow 
them to enter the market is via a local partner, i.e., the transnational media companies 
have to joint venture with the mainland Chinese investors, and Hong Kong filmmakers 
have to co-produce with the mainland Chinese filmmakers. Therefore, when the foreign 
media capital meets with the mainland Chinese state control, localization of the foreign 
media capital occurs. As the analytical framework shows, this localization of the foreign 
media capital happens in four aspects. The following part will analyse these aspects one 
by one. 
4,31 Localization of the Creative 
As previously mentioned, the creative indicates the creative production team and casts in 
the film. Localization of the creative will be examined in terms of how many local staff 
were involved in the film production process, and the extent to which there is local 
participation in the film creativity. The aim and goal of both FOCUS: First Cuts and 
Warner China Film HG was to encourage local productions with local appeal and to serve 
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the local audience, and Crazy Stone is a truly local produced film. 
With a Chinese privately owned production company Concord Creation Int'l 
Beijing Co. Ltd., from the director to the scriptwriter to the photography to the art 
director, all people involved the production were local mainland Chinese. All the cast 
were local mainland Chinese actors, except one who was from Hong Kong. Due to the 
limited budget, all the creative and cast are little-known, young talents. They received 
only a small amount of payment and most of them joined the team because of their love 
of and interest in this story. However, this young production team had its own advantage 
towards creativity and film production. With no big star, and no 'authority' among the 
team, they were able to always talk and discuss together freely their opinions on the 
script. They lived together during Crazy Stone�production, and in their own words, 
they were 'experiencing lives together, talking and filming the film together’.32 This 
kind of production team and local cast are not at all attractive to an audience and have 
little, if any, market appeal. However, such a free production atmosphere inspired a lot of 
innovative ideas and a collective intelligence. For example, the dialogue in the game 
centre between the son of head of the factory and several girls were actually encountered 
by one of this film's actor, and the making fun of Batman's plot was a collective idea after 
discussion. Another example relates to the only Hong Kong actor Teddy, who plays an 
apparently professional robber Mike. Director Ning and the scriptwriter formerly 
designed a storyline whereby he says 'Shit!' as his response whenever he suffers from 
bad luck. But when they discussed the scripts, Teddy told Ning and other cast that as a 
Cantonese, if someone suffers from bad luck or something goes awry, he would say ‘I 
butt your lung' (in Cantonese) rather than an English word ‘shit’. Ning and other cast 
liked this expression very much and immediately accepted this idea. Unexpectedly, ‘I 
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butt your lung' became one of the most popular storylines of Crazy Stone among the 
audiences and even become a new lingo for 'cool' people.^^ That is the great and 
unexpected value that a local creative team can add to the film. It is also the result of the 
creative having full autonomy in the creation and production process. Moreover, a local 
production team is more familiar with the local situation, such as policies, censorship and 
market tastes, and more important, contribute a great deal more to the localization of 
contents. For example, several cast members are local Sichuan people; they know the 
local dialects well and understand the most grass-root expressions, and they know well 
what is really 'local' and 'indigenous'. 
This autonomy lies in the film's investment mode, which separated ownership 
and control, and combined localization with foreign media capital. All the three partners 
were not directly responsible for the film production and did not intervene in the creative 
process. The foreign investment employed a local team to produce a local appeal 
cultural product. In Ning's own word, he is working only as an employee, 'getting the 
salary and producing a product，.34 Ning was selected by FOCUS: First Cuts with a 
script other than Crazy Stone, which had a higher budget that Focus would not pay. ‘But 
the biggest advantage is that my boss gives me full or even absolute freedom. With this 
budget of money, I can film whatever I want. My boss is supportive and doesn't ever 
intervene on my ideas and filming process.' Ning said. Two months after selected by 
FOCUS: First Cuts, Ning started his plan with that fixed budget of money for a lower 
budget film, Crazy Stone. The investors would not be responsible for whether the 
filmmaking budget would overrun or not, Ning and his production team had to control 
the expenses themselves. In other words, they had to make up for the overrun budget or 
they could keep any leftover budget as earnings. After the film was shown, no matter 
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how much box-office revenue it received, it was simply none of Ning's business—he 
would not get any extra bonus. In this sense, the relationship between Ning and FOCUS: 
First Cuts was really like an employee and employer. The only difference from other 
employee-employer relationship was that Ning and his creative team had full autonomy 
in the film creation and production. When I talked with Ning Hao during his stay in 
Hong Kong for Crazy Stone�promotion (from August 9 出 2 0 0 6 ) and called him 
'Director Ning', he laughed and referred to himself as a laborer rather than a director. ‘I 
am only an employee, and Andy Lau is my boss,' he said with an innocent smile. 
Such an ‘employer-employee，relationship and a local director and foreign 
investment cooperation assured that, on one hand, Ning did not have to owe his team's 
payment and made a balance for his filmmaking; on the other hand, his creative ideas for 
filmmaking could be produced. Filmmaking in mainland China exhibits a high threshold 
not only to those investors but also to the young talents. Constrained by both the Chinese 
government ideological control and the blockbuster culture, a tension between market-
oriented and state control, the young talents never have any way to put into practice their 
ideals for filmmaking and their innovative ideas. Their creativity and themes are always 
contradictory to the mainstream discourse and state ideology or touch the bottom-line of 
Chinese censorship. While they cannot find enough investment and support in the 
domestic market, they have to resort to the foreign market. The 'tortuous route' which is 
always adopted by the sixth generation of Chinese directors, who are the younger 
generation of directors after Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige and Feng Xiaogang, can also be 
considered as an alternative in that they resort to the foreign market in order to gain local 
exhibition. Ning's previous two feature films were following this route but failed to re-
enter the domestic market for a cinematic release. Besides, some young talent directors 
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also resort to foreign investment for producing their film ideas. For example, Jia 
Zhangke has long cooperated with French film investors and almost all of his films are 
invested in by French capital. His works are on one hand banned in domestic cinemas 
while on the other they are highly praised in international film festivals. These young 
talents have creativity and innovative ideas, and the foreign media companies have 
capital to invest. With foreign investment, these young talents' creative ideas can be 
produced into films. In this sense, the foreign media capital helps the rediscovery of the 
indigenous and local culture and makes it into cultural products. Such a situation sounds 
ironic and cynical. However, it is not the only case in the global capitalism and 
globalization era, as Japanese animation was made a popular global culture by 
transnational capital (mainly American) and the global distribution power (Iwabuchi, 
2000). Moreover, when it achieves success in the global market, it co-solidifies, rather 
than counters, the existing west-centric power relations and norms (Iwabuchi, 2000). 
Without the foreign investment involvement, in this case the regional film 
project一FOCUS: First Cuts, Ning's creative script Crazy Stone would still be a pile of 
paper written in black and white. He created this talented script in 2001 but had not been 
able to find an investor who showed interest in his script before encountering Warner 
and FOCUS: First Cuts. However，the foreign media capital's involvement in the local 
filmmaking is not simply an encouragement or kindness to help the rediscovery of local 
culture or the nurturing of young local talents; on the contrary, it is their route and local 
strategies to expand their global influences and a step to penetrate into the local market. 
After the great success of Crazy Stone, Warner China Film HG immediately signed 
a contract with Ning Hao, for a two-year, three-project deal (interview with Hu Min, 
April 4出，2007). Another of Ning's long-stock scripts is now on the agenda to be 
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produced. Many famous directors who have market appeal are all signed with local or 
foreign film companies, e.g., Zhang Yimou is affiliated to Beijing New Picture Film 
Corporation, and Feng Xiaogang to Huayi Brothers Media Group. Warner China Film 
HG, being a new latecomer to the industry, shows its desire and eagerness to have its own 
local director who can produce films that have market appeal and a 'serve the audience 
approach to the local market, as well as the company's vision to be a truly local film 
company in the mainland China market. 
4,32 Localization of the Content 
This local creative and production team brought in everyday people's lives, local content 
and simple expression techniques. As an 'outrageous, hip comedy'36，Crazy Stone 
touches sensitive social problems in the current Chinese society, showing a kind of black 
humor and satire on abuses in modern society, which has received high popularity among 
the audiences. Positioning Crazy Stone as 'the story and comedy of the Chinese 
Everyman '37’ Crazy Stone catches up-to-date events and hot social issues happening in 
audiences' daily life and fuses them into the film. 
It is a story centered on a priceless stone. Two gangs of bumbling thieves, and a 
group of loyal but mischievous amateur security guards carefully think out and compete 
schemes to steal or protect the precious stone, and in doing so they ensnare the mobs. 
While they are crazy about chasing for the stone, the audiences are crazy about its story 
plot. By depicting a closing-down state-owned factory and the keen eyes of real estate 
developer. Crazy Stone begins to reveal and expose the current reality in mainland China. 
With the reconstruction of the old city, the hot development of estate property, the 
music rings of mobile phones and fans of SMS, the move-in of migrant workers and the 
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lay-off of the state-owned companies' workers, etc., in a 98-minute film Crazy Stone 
conveys to the audience various aspects and details of current Chinese society. I will 
analyze this localization of content from two perspectives. The first one is 'everyman's 
life', which means the representation of the ordinary Chinese people' daily life that can 
resonate with audiences; the second is local representation and the re-invention of global 
elements. 
Regarding 'everyman's life', Crazy Stone captured every detail of Chinese 
people's daily life throughout the film. Ning Hao has regarded Chongqing as a hybrid 
city, embracing both shabbiness and modernity, almost as a miniature of the current 
social economic development and modernization process of all Chinese society. The 
noisy light rail carriage, the imposing circular viaduct, the shabby and crowded original 
city concurrent with the modern new city, the crummy public toilet, the men and women 
wearing pajamas playing Mahjong in the street downstairs their home, and the street 
vendors at those tourism scenes一all of the above are familiar scenes in and 
characteristics of the urbanization process of China. They can be considered a collective 
experience of the audiences' lives一what they have gone through, or are going through. 
One concrete example relates to the mobile phone. In 2006，there was a total of 430 
billion SMS sent by 0.46 billion mobile users in mainland C h i n a S M S has become a 
main route for people to communicate and even an indispensable part of Chinese 
people's daily life. In the film, we can easily notice that people in several shots played 
with their mobile phone and sent SMS. From the receptionist of the old inn to the office 
lady in the real estate company, they all were crazy fans of SMS. When visitors enquired 
at the reception desk, they answered in an indifferent way, without their eyes moving 
away from the mobile screens or their fingers stopping typing. Director Ning used these 
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shots to represent such an important aspect in people's daily life nowadays and also to 
show the irony of this phenomenon. And another example is that the story happens with 
a background of a closing-down state-owned factory and this factory has defaulted its 
workers' wages for months. Hundreds of workers in this factory have to face being laid-
off. It is also a common phenomenon and serious social problem in mainland China at 
present, since a series of reforms of state-owned companies in the late 1990s have meant 
that tens of millions of workers in mainland China have been laid-off，especially in 
inland China and some old cities. Chongqing，where Crazy Stone was shot, is one of 
these cities. Represented by a series of humorous and ironic episodes, the whole film 
miniatures almost every aspect and concern of Chinese society, and sheds light on the 
anxiety and greed among Chinese people. 
Crazy Stone also cleverly used the local dialects and populace expressions, which 
helped to develop its whole atmosphere of people's daily life. It mingles Sichuan 
dialects, Shan Dong dialects, Mandarin and Cantonese, which correspond to the settings 
of the film and the characteristics of each character. The local dialects have not restricted 
the film to certain areas and affected the understanding of audiences; on the contrary, the 
use of local dialects and the populace expressions has added great value to its humor as a 
comedy, and also contributes to the localization of the film content and reduces its 
distance for audiences. Netizens have summarized a series of typical dialogues and 
expressions in Crazy StonP, These dialogues and expressions are popular among the 
audience, and some of the expressions are becoming new lingo for young people. One of 
the most popular examples is the platitude of the apparently professional robber, Mike. 
Whenever he suffers from bad luck or things do not go smoothly, Mike will say in 
Cantonese ‘I butt your lung', which is foul language in Cantonese. This layman 
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Cantonese phrase in Crazy Stone has become one of the hottest pieces of lingo among 
audiences in mainland China. Crazy Stone also made clever use of some popular songs. 
For example, one of the thieves, Xiao Jun sings a popular national hit song of the Chinese 
singer Dao Lang, and cleverly changes its lyrics from ‘the first snow in 2002' to ‘the first 
shit in 2002，，to make flin of the similar pronunciation between snow and shit in Sichuan 
dialects. 
Secondly, concerning local representation and re-invention of global elements, I 
will use two main examples and some other details to illustrate. The first one relates to 
Coca-Cola. 'Coca-Cola' is the most recognized brand in the world and the word 'Coca-
Cola' itself is thought to be the second most widely understood word in the world after 
‘OK’.40 Moreover, Coca-cola is to a large degree identified with America and consuming 
Coke is always representative of consuming the American identity and values/' e.g. 
modernity and individualization. While in this film, Coca-Cola became a major clue that 
threaded the whole story together and a subject of fraud. The son of the head of the 
closing-down factory, drinking Coca-Cola on the cable car, flirted with a fashionable 
woman, who was the head of the thieves' girlfriend. The woman became tired of him 
and stepped on his foot with her high heel. The son shouted with pain and dropped his 
can of Coke out of the cable car. Coincidently，the can hit an old, shabby van owned by 
that factory that was running slowly down a slope. The amateur driver Bao, who was 
also the security guard that later protected the stone, stopped the van to see what had 
happened. He left the van, forgetting to lock the break. The van ran along the slope 
'automatically', till it collided with a BMW, which was owned by the real estate 
developer. Almost at the same time, Coke was leading an important role in another plot. 
Three frauds were using a can of Coca-Cola to deceive passengers on the metro. They sat 
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together and pretended to be strangers to each other. One of them opens the Coke and 
surprisingly finds a RMB 50 thousand cash prize on the Coke tab. He says he doesn't 
know how to claim this prize. At this moment, another fraud asks him to sell the Coke tab 
to him for RMB 5 thousand. Of course, the fraudster with the tab is not satisfied with the 
price the other fraudster gives, and they start bargaining in order to seduce the passengers 
to 'bid' for this tab. Similar frauds with similar tricks happen all around the country and 
audiences can easily find resonance with this representation. As mentioned by the 
director of Crazy Stone, Ning Hao, such fraud is always seen on TV news. The film had 
eliminated the original symbols or values that Coke holds, but reframed some new 
meanings and reinvented a new image for this global icon by adjusting to the local 
context. 
A second example is the BMW brand in Crazy Stone. The old, shabby van slid 
along the slope and finally collided with a BMW car. The driver of the BMW, who is 
also the secretary of the real estate developer, furiously shouts, 'What the hell high-tech? 
An unmanned car?' and points at the logo ' B M W , saying, 'Can't you read? Don't touch 
me!' BMW is also the short form for 'don't touch me，in Chinese characters ‘Bie Mo 
Wo'. Again, this plot reframed a local context and representation for BMW. In a global 
context, for example, in Hollywood's blockbusters James Bond 007 series, e.g. 
Tomorrow Never Dies, The World is Not Enough, BMW is always associated with 
wealth, power, handsome men, charming women or heroes. A BMW is also a symbol of 
an individual's status一a symbol of being successful, elegance and an independent spirit. 
However, in this case, BMW became a symbol of the parvenu and nouveau riches, who 
were upstarts and snobs. In the film, the driver of that BMW was the secretary of the real 
estate developer, wearing an unfitting suit, and behaving in low and petty ways. He was 
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really a snob, who flattered his boss while he hectored the lower class people, e.g. the 
closing-down factory workers and the security guard. When the BMW was collided with 
by the old, shabby van, and when the conflict between the owner of BMW and the 
security guard of the factory occurred, it symbolized an extreme disparity of the rich and 
the poor. BMW in this film, instead of being a symbol of wealth and elegance in the 
global context, locally symbolized inequality and a snobby mindset in the current 
Chinese society. 
Besides re-inventing global elements in a local context, Crazy Stone also made 
spoofs of some popular Hollywood and Chinese films, e.g. Mission Impossible and 
Batman. The Hong Kong professional thief Mike snuck into the temple where the 
priceless stone was exhibited, and imitated the classic action of Tom Cruise's character 
in Mission Impossible, wearing a black bodysuit and a head cover, hanging from the 
ceiling with a rope to the stone. He gradually approached the stone, professionally and 
beautifully, a recreation of the scene that we can see in Mission Impossible. As he 
removed the glass cover of the stone, the shot stopped for a second. He could not reach 
the stone; his rope was an inch shorter than it needed to be. While he was in the 
predicament, another thief from the local mob came in, taking away the stone without 
spending any effort. He laughed and fooled Mike by rotating him from the rope. Tom 
Cruise 's character was a competent and powerful man in Mission Impossible, while in 
Crazy Stone, Mike, wearing the same clothes and doing the same action, was mocked by 
even a gang of local mob. The clever use of foreign frames and tricks, and reframing 
them for local contexts marks another successful strategy of Crazy Stone� 
Being down-to-earth and showing grass-root reality are the biggest spotlights and 
attractions of Crazy Stone. All of these have overthrown the recent trend in the Chinese 
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film industry towards 'Chinese blockbusters', which depict heroism, nobility and the 
gorgeous luxury of ancient China. Just like a netizen comments on a popular BBS in 
mainland China, Crazy Stone has 'No royalty or nobles like Hero, no handsome men or 
beautiful women like The Promise, there are only reality from the bottom of the Chinese 
people's life. You may ridicule its vulgar or superficial, but you cannot deny the real life 
and phenomena it represents.，42 
The indigenous content of Crazy Stone caused great popularity and enthusiasm 
among the Chinese audiences. Crazy Stone was the first wide- release commercial film 
by Ning Hao. Ning says in his interview, "My previous films were never shown in 
domestic cinemas and only received investment from overseas market. I think such a 
mode is unhealthy. I hope to change this situation. Films, as a kind of cultural product, 
should be first accepted and consumed by the domestic market and after that, the 
overseas market."43 Similarly, Feng Xiaogang has put forth that film production has to 
cater for global tastes in order to enter the global markets at the expenses of local 
market.44 Audiences have a preference to local programs rather than the foreign ones (Lee, 
1988; Straubhaar, 1991; Chadha and Kavoori, 2000). In the mainland Chinese film 
market, it is not that audiences do not prefer a local film, but the biggest problem is that 
the Chinese film industry has not provided good local films that appeal to its audiences. 
Films of a genre like Crazy Stone are scarce in the mainland Chinese film market. 
The scarcity of the film genre like Crazy Stone probably has two main reasons. 
One is the Chinese film industry's pace and focus on cultural exports into global markets 
in recent years, which led to the Chinese blockbuster trend and homogeneous contents. 
This kind of homogeneous cultural product in return suppresses the existence and 
popularity of other kinds of cultural content. For example, when Zhang Yimou's 
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blockbusters are released, almost every screen in every cinema shows his film, thus, the 
low budget and indigenous films cannot even find a screen to be exhibited on in big 
cinemas in the major cities. While the younger generation of mainland Chinese directors, 
e.g., Jia Zhangke, focus on the past and old China, chasing for their honors and awards in 
the international film festivals and always being banned in the mainland cinemas; the 
prestigious directors who are attractive to the market, e.g.，Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige and 
Feng Xiaogang, keep a keen eye on going global by depicting ancient China. This means 
that there are few films representing present day China and even fewer touching the 
current social reality in a popular way. Crazy Stone fills in the vacancy between the 
ancient Chinese nobility films and the artistic films, and represent a true and up-to-date 
China in an understandable and popular way. These kinds of content and representation 
draw forth the other reason, that is the Chinese government's intervention and 
censorship restrictions towards film content and theme. This has long been inevitably 
producing stereotyped cultural content, and which is consistent with the Chinese 
government's intention to use media as an ideological control, e.g., the mainstream 
theme films (zhuxuanlv dianying). Up-to-date events and sharp social problems are 
always sensitive topics in the Chinese media and touch the bottom-line of the state's 
ideology and the mainstream discourse. Thus, films like Crazy Stone have long been 
'unwelcome' by the mainland Chinese government and received little attention from 
mainland film investors. 
In the Regulations on the Administration of Movies (2001)，it clearly states that 
contents 'which propagates obscenity, gambling, violence or instigates c r i m e s a r e 
prohibited from being filmed. In the Provisions on the Archival Filing of Film Scripts 
(Abstracts) and the Administration of Films (2006), it says further that 'Maliciously 
72 
disparaging the image of the people's army, armed police, public security organ or 
judicial department' or ‘mingling up with the contents of murder, violence or terrorism, 
confounding true and false, good and evil, or beautiful and ugly; confusing justice and 
injustice; deliberately displaying the rampancy of illegality or crime, particularly 
showing the details of crime, divulging special investigation means; having very irritant 
plots of murder, blood, violence, drug taking or gambling, etc., having plots of abuse of 
prisoners, extorting confessions by torturing criminals or criminal suspects; or having 
excessively frightening or horrific pictures, actor's lines, background music or sound 
effect' 46 should be deleted or altered. Such rigid censorship always exhibits an obstacle 
for creating films. In order to be approved by the censorship process, filmmakers always 
have to compromise with some creative ideas or contents. Fox example, at the ending of 
Feng Xiaogang's A World Without Thieves, the thieves were arrested by the police, 
which was consistent with the mainstream ideology but contrasted with most Hollywood 
and Hong Kong gangster films. Some mainland China and Hong Kong co-produced 
films and Hong Kong-made films have to alter the film plot or even set two different 
versions of endings so as to adapt to censorship, e.g., Infernal Affairs (2002) and 
Election (2005)/^ The original title of Crazy Stone was Thieves Among Thieves (Zei 
Zhong Zei) to express a complex and ensnaring network of various thieves in the film. 
However, when going through the censorship process, it was criticized that the title 
suggested 'too many thieves’48. Thus, Warner China HG changed its title to CrazyStone 
and negotiated this issue with the government. It took guanxi networking to facilitate it 
passing the censorship. Moreover, the ending of the film falls back to a mainstream 
discourse: the good man gets the precious stone while the thieves are dead or get nothing. 
It expresses respect to the ordinary but faithful people, with this ending depicts success 
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for the loyal security guards and failure or even death for the greedy capitalists, i.e. the 
real estate developer, and the thieves. 
4.33 Localization of the Economic 
The third level of localization in Crazy Stone is the localization of economic capital. The 
economic refers to the economic capital, that is, the investment that foreign media 
investors make in the Chinese film industry. This section of analysis will mainly deal 
with Warner's economic investment in the Chinese-foreign joint venture Warner China 
Film HG. Localization of the economic is the utmost important step in the whole 
localization of the foreign media capital process, since localization of the economic in the 
form of a joint venture company is a longer-term sustainable investment while the others 
are always merely single or short-term project investment. With its long term efforts， 
localization of the economic can consequently generate localization of other aspects. 
Warner has long been keen to expand its reach in the mainland Chinese market and 
has been striving for more than 10 years as the first comer among all the transnational 
media corporations in mainland China. Warner is the corporation with the most concern 
for the mainland Chinese market and has set specific representatives to deal with Chinese 
market and coordinate a relationship with the Chinese government (interview with Hu 
Min, April 4出，2007). In 2003, the overall circumstances for the Chinese film industry are 
much more open and both the private media company and foreign media investors see it 
as a best opportunity to advance their step into the film industry. SARFT issued two 
important regulations this year: the Interim Provisions on the Access of Operational 
Qualifications for Movie Production, Distribution and Projection; and the Provisional 
Regulation on Investment in Cinemas by Foreign Investors. Both regulations are a 
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favorable sign to the private and foreign investors, as they signal an unprecedented 
openness in the Chinese film industry. At the same time, SARFT and Hengdian Group 
were negotiating on another project, for the first and only media experimental district in 
mainland China. In late 2003 and early 2004，the establishment of the Hengdian Chinese 
Film Industrial Part was approved. When the private media capital had already been 
invited into the Chinese film industry, SARFT was considering whether this openness 
towards foreign investors could be wider (interview with Hu Min, April 4(卜，2007). Thus, 
this three-partner integration has been put on the agenda. In October 2004，SARFT and 
the Ministry of Commerce of China issued a new regulation, Interim Provisions on 
Operation Qualification Access for Movie Enterprises, especially for facilitating the 
formation of Warner China Film HG. Initiated and brought together by SARFT，only two 
months after the regulation takes into effect the China Film Group, China's leading state-
owned filmed entertainment conglomerate; Warner Bros. Pictures, a global media 
conglomerate; and Hengdian Group, China's largest privately owned film and television 
enterprise, joined together to form a newly power bloc, Warner China Film HG. 
Localizing its economic capital in terms of a joint venture company, Warner can 
enjoy the film production and distribution through this film company together with its 
two local partners. In this newly established company, Warner employs the other two 
local partners' advantage to facilitate its successful localization of the economic, while 
these two local partners, especially the state-owned China Film Group，also drive 
Warner's localization by integrating its strengths in the new company. In Warner China 
Film HG, the China Film Group, Warner Bros, and Hengdian Group respectively hold the 
company stake at a ratio of 4:3:3 and have a clear division of labor according to their own 
strength in the industry. Hence, concerning the structure of this company, Warner is 
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mainly responsible for film production, distribution and marketing in Warner China Film 
HG. It also brings its advanced production technology and market operation ability. 
China Film Group contributes mainly to the guanxi networking for this newly 
constructed company, especially the relationship with the Chinese government. As the 
largest state-owned film company, China Film Group has long enjoyed privileges over 
other film company in the mainland Chinese film market, e.g., the exclusive distribution 
right to distribute imported films, and its affiliated company, China Film Co-production 
Corporation, holds exclusive rights to process all co-productions accessing the mainland 
Chinese film market. When I asked how close the relationship is between China Film 
Group and the Chinese government, Hu Min, vice president of Warner China Film HG, 
answered me as that the former president of China Film Group is the present president of 
SARFT. With this close relationship with the government, China Film Group in Warner 
China Film HG is mainly dealing with project development and film production. The 
Hengdian Group, which has its strength in the production resources and has the largest 
Chinese production site—regarded as the China's Hollywood'*^—is mainly responsible 
for administration of the new company. Thus, constructed by these three partners who 
respectively have their own strength in the industry, the integration of these three parts of 
capital forms a complete industrial chain in filmmaking. 
In terms of the management of the company, as Warner China Film HG is in 
transition now, one concerned business partner described it as 'rudderless'^®. There are 
only three vice presidents respectively representative for the three partners, but currently 
no CEO in the joint company. Warner's representative, Ellen Eliasoph, holds the 
concurrent post of Managing Director, Warner Bros. (China). Hu Min, from the 
company's third partner Hengdian Group, is the lone full-time vice president in this joint 
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venture. With regard to the decision making process, each project and proposal has to be 
processed through all three partners. Any one of them has the right to veto, and only with 
the approval of all three could further action take place on that project. For example, the 
issue that received the most discussion and negotiation between the three partners was 
on the main business of this new company (interview with Hu Min, April 4'^2007). 
Warner Bros., as one of the world's most powerful media conglomerates, is proficient in 
film and television as well as other kinds of media products, while the Hengdian Group is 
also involved in several areas. Warner and Hengdian Group proposed the main business 
area of Warner China Film HG can be both film and television. However, China Film 
Group insisted its main business should be more focused on one area, is the film 
industry. Eventually, Warner and Hengdian gave in and followed China Film Group's 
proposal that Warner China Film HG will concentrate its business only on film. Also, 
when they discussed where the new company would be located, different opinions rose 
again. Hengdian Group proposed to locate the new company in the newly constructed 
Hengdian Chinese Film Industrial Park, and Warner agreed on this proposal as well, 
while China Film Group disagreed. It suggested the new company should be located in 
the Beijing Film Production Factory, which is near the location of China Film Group. 
They finally came up with the consensus to locate the new company in the Beijing Film 
Production Factory. Co incidentally, and ironically enough, its location is right next to 
State Copyright Bureau. In the decision making process, after all, China Film Group 
owns 40% of the stake and holds the relative controlling interest. Thus, China Film 
Group has always held the final decision over Warner and Hengdian. However, this kind 
of decision making process between three partners sometimes causes inefficiency in 
processing projects. Moreover, as the three partners come from different backgrounds 
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and types of organizations, they have different working styles, which need some time to 
coordinate with each other. For example, Hu held the opinion that Warner does not fully 
understand the Chinese film market and the way to deal and negotiate. In his words, some 
of Warner's kinds of working style and operation modes would probably destroy the 
whole thing. He specifically points out The Painted Veil, the first Chinese and American 
co-production, which ended up being a commercial disappointment (interview with Hu 
Min, April 2007). Eliasoph also claimed it was 'hard to shape' co-productions and was 
difficult to make them successful after the failure of The Painted Veil. ^ ^ 
As an integration of state capital, foreign media capital and Chinese private capital, 
Warner China Film HG shows a great advantage in market competition. Together with 
Warner's merging and localizing in the new company, the local companies can also learn 
the advanced operation and management model from its foreign partner. For example, 
Eliasoph mentioned the joint company's adoption of some Hollywood models of 
operation, e.g., build a talent deal with Ning Hao for a two-year, three-project contract.^^ 
With regard to the advantage of Warner China Film HG in the market competition, it is 
mainly formed by a complete industrial chain that Warner China Film HG has established. 
At the time of Crazy Stone's show, Warner Bros” China Film Group and Hengdian 
Group all had their own cinemas, Warner had joint ventured in six cinemas in six cities 
(before Warner withdrew its business from the Chinese cinemas in 2006), while 
Hengdian Group owns or holds stake for another four theatre chains and two cinemas, 
which took up about 8% of the domestic box-office in 2006 (interview with Shi Weidong, 
March 26山，2007). China Film Group is also constructing a cinema building, joint 
partnered with the privately owned Stellar MegaMedia, to form China Film Stellar 
Theatre Chain, which is now the largest theatre chain in mainland China. It also holds or 
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joins other theatre chains, e.g., China Film South Cinema Circuit Co., Ltd., Beijing New 
Film Association and Sichuan Pacific Cinema Circuit Co., Ltd, etc. Such a vertically-
integrated system is of great benefit, especially for low-budget films like Crazy Stone. On 
one hand, as the four-city screening shows (further illustrated in a later part) for Crazy 
Stone�promotion, more than half of the screening cinemas are held or joined stock by 
China Film Group and Warner, i.e. Chengdu Tai Ping Yang cinema, Beijing UME Hua 
Xing cinema, Chongqing UME cinema, Chongqing Warner Cinema and Changsha 
Warner cinema (see Table 5). Such a large-scale market occupation of cinemas offers a 
convenient platform for the film's marketing promotion. On the other hand, more 
important is that it ensures sufficient theatres and houses for its cinematic release. The 
fundamental contribution of Warner China Film HG to the success of Crazy Stone is this 
excellance of resources in a complete film industrial chain. 
In addition, there is also a subtle observation in the formation of Warner China Film 
HG. In its English name, composed of these three partners, the order is that Warner 
comes first, China Film Group follows and Hengdian Group is the last; while in its 
Chinese name, China Film Group is the first in order, followed by Warner and then 
Hengdian Group. The different arrangement in order indicates their different statuses in 
the mainland Chinese market and the global market, and their respective attempts 
towards localization or globalization. In the mainland Chinese market, China Film 
Group still holds the relative controlling interest; when it comes to global business, it 
has to rely on the power relations of Warner Bros, to expand its business into the global 
market. 
4.34 Localization of Marketing Strategies—Word-of-Mouth and 'Opportunistic' 
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Strategies 
Being the first film distributed and released by Warner China Film HG，Crazy Stone v^di^ 
Warner China Film HG's first attempt to test the local market. With a limited and small 
budget, Warner China Film HG did not make a grand and long promotion period before 
its general release. However, it made a series of specific marketing promotions, specially 
adapting to the film and the market, which can be considered a localization of marketing 
strategies. Crazy Stone's, promotion activities only began a month before its cinematic 
release, depending primarily on its four-city screening events, Shanghai, Chengdu, Bejing 
and Chongqing. These screening events were free for audiences, with the purpose of 
generating word-of-mouth interest in the film. Because it was a Sichuan dialect film, the 
four-city screening events included two cities from the Sichuan Province, Chongqing and 
Chengdu, as well as two of the largest cities in mainland China, Beijing and Shanghai,. 
Moreover, among the seven screening events in total, those two Sichuan cities took up 
four cinema screens and held a total of 20 shows, compared with one screen with one 
show in Shanghai, and one screen with five shows in Beijing. These promotional events 
were a great success in the four screens in Chongqing and Chengdu, for all the screenings 
were full-houses, and almost all members of the audiences gave scores of 90 or above on 
the questionnaire after watching the film. 
Date City Theatre Seat count # S h o w s “ 
June 24th, 2 0 0 6 S h a n g h a i Shang Ying Cinaplex m i 
June 25th，2006Chengdu Tai Ping Yang m 5 
June 25th，2006Chengdu Shiji Dongfang 5 
June 27th，2006Beijing UME Hua Xing 5 
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June 27th’ 2006 C h o n g q i n g U M E ^ 5 
June 2 8 ^ 2006 Chongqing Warner Cinema 200 5 ~ ~ 
June 29th，2006Changsha Warner Cinema 5 
Table 5\ Four-City Screening Strategy for Crazy Stone 
Source: Warner China Film HG's marketing plan for Crazy Stone, June 2006. 
The promotion strategies also heavily depended on the municipal, provincial and 
national press coverage of these events to spread awareness of the film. The promotion 
event of Crazy Stone reached its first peak at the Shanghai International Film Festival in 
June 19th 2006. It was the premiere of Crazy Stone and was only 11 days before its 
general release to cinemas. This was a great opportunity for word-of-mouth promotion 
and generating national-wide awareness of the film. However, as a low-budget film with 
an unknown director and no star actors, Crazy Stone had few appeals to the press. Warner 
China Film HG discussed with Focus Films to invite its investor, the boss of Focus Films, 
famous Asian star Andy Lau, to participate in the premiere of Crazy Stone. This was 
another advantage of this co-production. Without the joint partner relationship with Andy 
Lau, the payment for invitating him to join the event could have cost as much as their 
entire proposed marketing budget (interview with Hu Min, April 2007). Andy Lau's 
participation attracted a lot of press and the word-of-mouth strategy was in full play. The 
day after its first show, more than 20 mainland Chinese newspapers reported CrazyStone 
and gave it great praise. 
To keep on with the efforts, Warner China Film HG introduced media-promoted 
screenings, inviting press and filmmakers to attend, a week before its general opening. 
According to Warner China Film HG's marketing plan for Crazy Stone, ‘The campaign is 
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driven by a bold screening program and thus print coverage will feed on press frenzy 
generated post free screenings in key cities as near release date as p o s s i b l e A f t e r these 
media-promoted screenings, newspaper reporters, filmmakers and some famous directors 
all showed great interest and praise on the film. 56 The press coverage continued to spread 
the screening events from the day after Crazy Stone's screening events till its general 
cinematic release. Nanfang Metro Daily, one of the most influential daily newspapers in 
mainland China and the best-seller in Guangdong province, reserved three full pages of 
coverage to introduce Crazy Stone in detail for three successive days, right before Crazy 
Stone�general cinematic release. After the first day of general release and the first 
weekend box-office coming out, Nanfang Metro Daily made consecutive film reviews of 
it, claiming it to be a hope of the future of Chinese film industry and asking the audiences 
to go to cinema to see this film in the name of giving a chance to the Chinese film 
industry.57 intensive coverage by Nanfang Metro Daily d id a great favor to Crazy Stone's 
cinematic release in Guangdong province and to a certain extent guaranteed its box-office 
success in Guangdong. With overwhelming press coverage, the first weekend box-office 
revenue of Crazy Stone was about RMB 2 million, which was an unexpected miracle for 
such a low-budget film. Nevertheless, what was an even bigger surprise was that its box-
office gradually increased by the end of the first week. By the end of the second week of 
its general release, Crazy Stone�box-office earnings had reached RMB 6 million, 
indicating that its box-office earnings had increased by 100% compared with the first 
week's box-office，and its third week's box-office earnings continued to climb to exceed 
the second week's. In most situations, a film's second week box-office revenue will fall 
by 30-70% compared with the first week's box-office revenue. However, Crazy Stone 
broke this convention. Its box-office gradually increased after its first weekend, with an 
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increase of almost 30% every day towards the second week.^^ Such an extraordinary box-
office trend demonstrates the success of word-of-mouth strategies. 
The most innovative and 'Chinese characteristic' promotion stratey is called 
'Internet mass promotion' (interview with Hu Min, April 4出，2007). In mainland China, 
the Internet serves as an important media in spreading information, especially among 
Chinese youth. As Crazy Stone targeted its audiences as young adults aged 18-24 and 
adults aged 24- 'Internet mass promotion' was a clever and relatively cheap strategy, 
and it also indicated a successful localization of marketing strategies in the mainland 
China film market. Warner China Film HG resorted to all kinds of Internet platforms in 
order to most widely reach its target audiences. Crazy Stone�official website was built 
in partnership with Sina.com.cn, which is one of the most influential gateway websites in 
mainland China, to coincide with its cinematic release. After its successful premiere in 
the Shanghai International Film Festival and the screening events, Crazy Stone opened its 
own blog on Sina.com.cn on June 2006, chasing the popular habit of blogging among 
netizens in mainland China, since many stars had opened their own blog from 2005.60 
Moreover, a blog is an up-to-date medium, which includes more interaction with 
audiences. Within its first month of opening, Crazy Stone�blog had attracted more than 
200 thousand browsers (interview with Hu Min, April 2007). Besides the official 
website and the blog, the creative of Crazy Stone and other film lovers built forums and 
BBS especially for Crazy Stone, e.g., http://bbs.sina.com.en/zt/w/shitou, and 
http://www.vesdianving.com/index. asp?boardid=ll. Warner China Film HG also 
intentionally made some discussions and news about Crazy Stone on the main forums in 
mainland China, which gave rise to netizens creating follow-up discussions. This 
'Internet mass promotion' contributed greatly to the word-of-mouth success of Crazy 
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Stone, and it really reached its targets. Crazy Stone became a hit topic online, when 
searching on the largest Chinese search engine, Baidu.com，with the key word 'Crazy 
Stone' (in Chinese), more than three million websites appear.^' And this popularity online 
in return contributed to Crazy Stone's offline popularity. 
Besides the promotion strategies, Warner China Film HG won a favorable schedule 
for Crazy Stone's cinematic release. There was a prevalent saying among media that for 
one month following June 10"^  2006 was the mainland Chinese-made film's protection 
month.62 In this month, no profit-sharing imported blockbusters would be on show, 
except those had already been shown before June 10�*\ The first time the saying of 
'protection month' prevailed was at the end of 2004, when House of Flying Daggers was 
released. That year, House ofFlying Daggers gained RMB 160 million (USD 20 million) 
at the box-office in the domestic market. In August 2005，the saying of 'Chinese-made 
film protection month' prevailed again. In this month, War of the Worlds was delayed 
from the showing schedule, while Seven Swords, a co-production, enjoyed the privilege 
as a Chinese-made blockbuster. Undoubtedly enough, the Chinese-made blockbusters are 
always the biggest beneficiary. However, the protection month in 2006 at first seemed a 
little unusual and sudden. During this month, no Chinese blockbusters or any mainstream 
films were proposed to be shown. Warner China Film HG chose such a schedule for the 
general cinematic release for Crazy Stone. During Crazy Stone�general release, there 
were two profit-sharing imported blockbusters, Poseidon and Ice Age 2, which were on 
show before June 10th，and other low-budget Chinese-made films, the most famous one 
being by a Chinese actress and female director, Xu Jinglei, called Dreams May Come, 
Meanwhile, the most competitive Hollywood blockbusters in the summer schedule, 
Superman Returns and Mission Impossible 3 were respectively scheduled to release on 
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July irh and July 20出’ right after the end date, July 10^ of the ‘rumor，about the 
Chinese-made film protection month. The summer schedule, which is from mid-June to 
August, is one of the five major showing schedules in the mainland film market. As the 
main target audiences of Crazy Stone were young adults aged 18-24, the summer 
schedule really was a most favorable schedule for Crazy Stone, Some film industry 
insiders admit that the intervention by the Chinese government on the film companies' 
choice in scheduling the films, and that those companies who have better relationships 
and networks with the government can get better showing schedules (interview with Qu 
Yue, March 30th 2007; interview with Geng Xilin, April 1 2 0 0 7 ) . In the meantime, with 
the influences of the 2006 World Cup, many distributors did not show confidence in the 
box-office during this period and avoided trying to have their films shown. Crazy Stone 
got its cinematic release on 30th j^ne 2006, which was 10 days from the 2006 World Cup 
final and the rumored 'protection' month. This schedule helped it to win the first most 
critical two weeks of exhibition, and in those ten days, Crazy Stone gained good word-of-
mouth reviews and over RMB 6.2 million (USD 0.8 million) in box-office revenue." 
Furthermore, another Chinese local specific issue is piracy. To win at the box-office, 
piracy is a n important factor to deal with in the mainland Chinese film market. Every 
year in the mainland Chinese film market, loss of box-office and video market earnings 
due to piracy reaches RMB 1 billion (USD 128 million), and if a film can restrict the 
piracy a week after its general cinematic release, it means success for its box-office.64 For 
example, Zhang Yimou's blockbusters have always successfully prohibited piracy, e.g., 
Hero released its authorized video two months after its cinematic release. However, in the 
mainland Chinese film market, there are myths about how to control piracy. Film 
practitioners are always reluctant to reveal the rules of the game in dealing with piracy. 
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Nevertheless, during my internship, a practitioner, who would like to keep anonymous, 
told me that the controlling of piracy is a deal between the Chinese government and the 
film company. The film company can make a deal with the Chinese government on how 
many days and which cities it would like to prohibit the piracy. This kind of black-box is 
weird and incredible to the foreign investors. Eliasoph said that it was 'very hard' to do 
what Warner China Film HG is doing in a market that is 'beaten down' by piracy and a 
lack of cinemas.65 In the case of Crazy Stone, piracy was also successfully prohibited in 
the mainland film market. Pirated DVD or any online downloads in the market were 
prevented between the cinematic release and the DVD release. Ten days after Crazy 
Stone�general cinematic release, on July 10th，Warner China Film HG released its 
authorized DVD, and coincidently, it was the end date of the rumored Chinese-made film 
protection month, which was also the day before the cinematic release of Superman 
Returns in mainland China cinemas. With ten days of public praise and word-of-mouth 
coverage online and offline for Crazy Stone, Superman Returns made little influence on 
Crazy Stone�cinematic box-office success; on the contrary, in the video market Crazy 
Stone won as well. The first print of 300,000 DVDs were all sold out within ten days after 
its release.66 To restrict the adverseness of piracy after its DVD release, Warner China 
Film HG decided to release two versions of the DVD, a silver version with exquisite 
packaging and a simplified version, and both versions specially record an interview with 
its director Ning Hao. What is more important, these two versions had a competitive price 
compared with the pirated video. The silver version only cost RMB 15 (USD 2) and the 
simplified one was even cheaper, only RMB 10 (USD 1.2). For an all-round restriction of 
piracy, Warner China Film HG sold the online download rights to a Beijing company. 
Soon after the release of DVD, its online download services were available. This chain of 
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cinematic release, video release and authorized online download indicates an innovative 
attempt in the Chinese film industry. As an important part of its local strategies, this 
distribution chain reveals Warner China Film HG's first attempt to tailor-make a Chinese-
specific profitable mode in the mainland Chinese film market. 
4.35 Success of Crazy Stone 
Eventually, Crazy Stone earned box-office revenue of RMB 23 million (USD 3 million) 
and more than 100 copies for cinematic release. Box-office revenue per copy of Crazy 
Stone ended up to be more than RMB 150,000, which was a very high index and almost 
approached what those imported or Chinese blockbusters could achieve, e.g., Mission 
Impossible 3 got a box-office revenue of RMB 80 million with 400 copies, and The 
Banquet, earned a box-office revenue of RMB 130 million with nearly 600 copies (see 
Appendix 1，2). One more inspiring success of Crazy Stone over those previous films is 
that a dialect film of this kind was always limited to regions and could hardly receive 
nation-wide popularity. Even though the previous films of the most successful Chinese 
dialect film director, Feng Xiaogang, have always been well received in Northern and 
inner western China, in Southern and Eastern Chin, they have not been popular among 
audiences. Nevertheless, Crazy Stone received nationa-wide popularity. According to 
Crazy Stone's distributor, Warner China Film HG, the Guangdong Zhujiang Theatre 
Chain ranks NO. 1 among all the domestic theatre chains that screened Crazy Stone, 
with a box-office of RMB 2.56 million; Beijing New Film Association ranks NO. 2 with 
RMB 2.41 million; and China Film South Cinema Circuit Co., Ltd. and China Film 
Stellar Film Chain Co., Ltd. both received a box-office over RMB 2.2 million. 
In the meantime, we can see that this is not only the success of Warner China Film 
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HG, but also the success of its three parent companies. As I have previously mentioned, 
in the profit sharing, theatre chains or cinemas got 50% of the box-office revenue. Those 
theatre chains that got the most box-office revenue from Crazy Stone are all controlled 
by or joint ventures of the China Film Group and Hengdian Group, e.g., the NO. 1 
Guangdong Zhujiang Theatre Chain by Hengdian Group, Beijing New Film Association, 
China Film South Cinema Circuit Co., Ltd. and China Film Stellar Film Chain Co., Ltd. 
by China Film Group. In the final analysis, Warner China Film HG has invested in 
Crazy Stone for about RMB 3 million, and through the profit sharing of box-office 
revenue, distribution right for television channels, video release and online video-on-
demand, etc., the total revenue ends up to be more than RMB 9 million (USD 1.2 
million), which is a return of three times its investment. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion and Discussion 
5.1 Localization as Prerequisites 
With years of media liberalization and marketization in mainland China, the Chinese film 
industry gradually embraced the joint partnership of foreign media capital and Chinese 
local private capital in the commencement of century. The huge, relatively 
unexploited market in mainland China is greatly attractive to the foreign media investors; 
meanwhile, it causes a challenge for the Chinese state, the rising Chinese private 
investors, as well as the foreign investors as to how to negotiate and interplay with other 
players and achieve a win-win situation. While China begins to focus on cultural exports 
and global markets, this study shifts the attention from the local going 'global' to the 
domestic market, i.e. the global entering the 'local' market. Thus, this study takes Crazy 
Stone as a case study to analyze the successful strategies of localization of the foreign 
media capitals. 
Crazy Stone, as a co-production by Focus Film Ltd. (Hong Kong), Warner China 
Film HG and Concord Creation Int'l Beijing Co., Ltd., performs a triangular interaction 
among the complex power relations, state control and global capitalism. It also entails the 
state, the rising Chinese private capital and foreign media capital in this newly constituted 
power bloc. Approaching from a political economic perspective, this study used 
interviews and participant observation to examine the strategies of localization of the 
foreign media capital. This study finds that localization of the foreign media capital 
occurs in all four aspects of film industry, i.e. the creative, the content, the economic and 
the marketing strategies, with a local cultural product, Crazy Stone, and a joint venture 
company, Warner China Film HG, as the results of localization. Regarding localization of 
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the creative, we can see a truly local production team and cast involved in the production 
of Crazy Stone, contributing in large part to the localization of the film's content. That 
localization of the content was implemented in two aspects. One was the representation 
of the ordinary Chinese people' daily life; the other was local representation and re-
invention of global elements. The localization of the economi was accomplished by 
Warner's joint venture with China Film Group and Hengdian Group for a Chinese-foreign 
joint film company, and its localization of the economic was facilitated also by 
employing each partners' respective advantages in the film industry. With regard to the 
localization of marketing strategies, Warner China Film HG made a series of specific 
marketing promotions that were specially adapted for the film and the market, i.e. four-
city screening promotion events, Shanghai International Film Festival premiere and 
media promotion, 'Internet mass promotion', a favorable showing schedule and an 
efficient and successful anti-piracy strategy. 
In general, such localization of foreign media capital is an accomplishment in two 
senses. On one hand, for the sake of market penetration, the foreign media corporations 
have to adopt the strategies of localization and show adherence to the mainland Chinese 
state; on the other hand, as the mainland Chinese government gradually embraces foreign 
capital into the Chinese media industries, localization becomes a prerequisite and national 
strategy that these foreign investors are required to implement. The foreign media capital 
then gradually becomes involved in the Chinese film industry. However, the foreign 
investors' adherence and cooperation with the Chinese state cannot change the power 
structure in the mainland Chinese film industry. In the newly constituted power bloc of 
the Chinese state, the rising Chinese private capital and the foreign investors, the Chinese 
state still occupies the monopolistic status in the local industry, and the other two partners 
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are relatively subordinate to the state control. The Chinese government controls the 
development of the local film industry and restricts the access of foreign investors by 
administrative means like policies and a high threshold for the foreign investors, which 
requires them to take a localization approach, e.g. cooperation with local partners. 
Moreover, in this study we observe a strategic and functional capital formation, which 
constitutes the light of division of cultural labor. In both Crazy Stone and in Warner China 
Film HG, each of the three partners function in terms of their own strengths and employs 
each other's merits to facilitate the success of the film or the joint company. Such 
functional capital formation exhibits strategic values in the Chinese film market 
competition. With the Chinese state-owned company's monopolistic status in the industry, 
this formation enjoys the allocation of state resources, flexibility and talents by the 
privately owned media company, and the advanced experience brought by the foreign 
media corporations. 
Meanwhile, with regard to the success of Crazy Stone, this study finds that it was 
the success of the return of indigenous culture with popular representation. China has a 
massive domestic market, and taking into account the absolute size of markets for 
Chinese-language content—national, regional and diasporic~that success is mostly a 
matter of getting the content right (Keane, 2006). In the case of Crazy Stone, it really got 
the right content catering to the right target audiences at the right time. However, the 
rediscovery of indigenous culture is necessarily conditioned by its investment mode and 
the openness of Chinese film policies. Crazy Stone was first discovered by Warner and 
was the first local attempt of Warner China Film HG, and it joined the regional film 
project FOCUS: First Cuts with Hong Kong investment. The investment mode of 
combining foreign media capital and Chinese private capital released the burden that 
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would probably have occurred if it were only a state investment film, and finally put 
Ning's long in stock script on the screen. In this sense, the success of Crazy Stone does 
not merely lie in the film itself, but in the openness of Chinese media policies towards 
foreign investment and censorship of cultural content. Chinese films have long been 
tamed to be obedient within the boundary, while the increasingly open policies are 
released, those fims that have been constrained will come out, e.g., Crazy Stone, which is 
popular and appeals to audiences. 
5.2 Localization, Regionalization and Globalization一A Chinese-specific Possible 
Film Development Model 
Some scholars hold negative and pessimistic attitudes towards the prospects of foreign 
media corporations in mainland China (e.g. Lee, 2004) due to the state control by CCP. 
This study exhibits a positive view. Joint partnership with local production company to 
make a co-production film is a possible and favorable route for foreign media to access 
the mainland Chinese film market. Being the first film distributed by Warner China Film 
HG and the first foreign joint film corporation in mainland China, Crazy Stone reveals 
the interplay of power between the state, the emerging Chinese private capital and the 
foreign media capital, which supplement the former theoretical concepts with a 'state-
private-global media complex' in the future development of the Chinese film industry. A 
more significant localization strategy lies in Warner China Film HG. The formation of 
Warner China Film HG exhibits the Chinese state's embrace with global capitalism as 
well as the aspirations of global media corporations to penetrate the mainland Chinese 
market. Warner China Film HG invites an innovative way for the localization of the 
foreign media capital and exhibits the mutual will towards localization between the 
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Chinese state and the foreign media corporation. Unlike the previous research on 
globalization and localization, which always held an active-passive dichotomy between 
the global invader and the local receiver, this case study exhibits a dynamic interplay 
between the foreign investors and the local government and companies. In this case, both 
the state and the foreign media companies are active players in the process of localization, 
and it is accomplished through collaboration between the two. Localization of the 
foreign media capital cannot be achieved without the Chinese cooperation and 
participation. When the state policies restrict the entry of the foreign media capital, 
localization becomes a stepping-stone to cater for the local government, and in return, get 
an admission ticket into the mainland China market. A symbiotic relationship exists here 
between the Chinese government and the foreign investors. Instead of jeopardizing the 
survival of the Chinese film industry, the successful localization of foreign media capital 
sustains and strengthens the industry. Shi (2006) uses the term 'the taming of the shrew' 
to describe the Chinese state encounter with the transnational media corporations, and 
this taming is bi-directional. In this study, both the Chinese state and the foreign media 
investors are the shrew that the other intends to tame. As in the case of Warner China 
Film HG, the transnational media corporation can only claim for its niche in the Chinese 
film market after it is 'tamed' and regulated by the Chinese state control. This case study 
also gives rise to the reinvention of the term 'glocal' for this newly constituted invention 
between the state, private and the transnational. 
In addition, most previous studies concerning the foreign media corporations and 
the Chinese state have mainly examined the Chinese television markets and seldom gave 
a comprehensive examination into the Chinese film industry. Since television is more 
ubiquitous and plays an immeasurably important role in people's daily, television 
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displays a higher tension between the state control and the foreign media corporations' 
negotiation. However, as Chinese living standards are gradually rising and more people 
are finding their habit of going to the cinema, the film industry becomes a new field of 
battle to be explored. As Keane (2006:848) claims that 'China is important in the media 
development model', this study attempts to make a critical analysis of the foreign capital 
in Chinese film market, so as to make the map of the mainland Chinese media industry 
more complete and more important, and put mainland China on the map in the global 
network. Furthermore, the previous research and studies about globalization and 
localization have always focused on the globalization or localization of cultural contents, 
while this study begins its analysis from the localization of media capital and reveals that 
there are several levels in the localization process. Based on the analysis of localization of 
the foreign media capital together with the analysis on four aspects of localization, it also 
tackles the relationship between the localization of media capital and the localization of 
cultural products and texts. 
Chan (2005) suggests that regionalization should be brought in to compensate for 
the deficiency of the globalization framework when examining communication patterns 
in China. Hence, tracing back to the analytical framework {Figure 4 on pp.48), we can 
observe a possibility that the Chinese government intends to form a regional film 
industry by including Hong Kong as a regional site. From the reviews of Chinese media 
policies towards Hong Kong filmmakers, especially the execution of CEPA, the Chinese 
government deliberately restricts the access and development of foreign media capital in 
mainland Chinese film industry, while favoring investments by Hong Kong filmmakers. 
Meanwhile, for the Hong Kong film industry, the co-production with mainland Chinese 
film makers and the categorization of Hong Kong film as mainland Chinese-made film 
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demonstrate the mainland Chinese government's intention to embrace the Hong Kong 
film industry and its strategic capital into a newly constituted regional film industry. 
Together with the long established status and influence of the Hong Kong film industry 
in Asia and the world, this integration of a new regional film industry shows the Chinese 
strategic attempt to expand its influence in the regional film market and its ambition to 
enter the global market, as well as countering the global penetration in the domestic 
market, especially Hollywood's domination. Furthermore, this action is also actively 
protects the rising and developing mainland Chinese film industry, which reserves 
substantial time and space for it. 
Therefore, such integration into the regional film industry reveals a great 
opportunity for Hong Kong film makers to re-prosper their industry, as well as a great 
challenge. Just like in the 1990s, over-dependency of the Hong Kong film industry on 
overseas markets inevitably led to compromise over the tastes of different markets, at the 
expense of local taste and the local market. Thus, when the overseas markets shrink, the 
local market is also lost. Therefore, when it is integrated into the regional mainland 
Chinese film industry via co-production and collaboration, there exists a challenge for the 
Hong Kong film industry as to how it will retain its own culture and identity. 
This also presents a picture of a possible development model in the mainland 
Chinese film industry. In this case Crazy Stone and its company Warner China Film HG, 
took the strategies of localization and formed a 'state-private-global' complex. These 
strategies are proven to be successful for foreign media capital to enter the mainland 
Chinese film market, and from these concrete strategies and the model it bases on, we can 
anticipate other possible strategies or paths to access the market from this model. For 
instance, foreign media investors can first joint venture with Hong Kong film companies 
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to make use of the relatively favorable policies that the Chinese government sets for the 
Hong Kong filmmakers, so as to overcome the obstacles of the Chinese policies towards 
other foreign investors. As CEPA sets no restrictions on the kinds of companies, joint 
venture and foreign investors' acquisition of Hong Kong companies can also enjoy the 
articles in the agreement, only with a requirement for owning more than 50% of equity 
interests for at least one year, or owning less than 50% of a Hong Kong company.67 This 
two-step flow into the mainland Chinese film market, with Hong Kong as an intermediary, 
also demonstrates a possible strategy for the foreign media investors. On the other side, 
when the Chinese film industry attempts to go global，it is not necessary to include the 
Hong Kong film industry as part of its strategic integration. Since many transnational 
media conglomerates are keen to embrace China into global capitalism, there are other 
possible paths and opportunities for the Chinese film industry to enter the global markets. 
Hence, this model also catches on the dynamics between the local, regional and global. 
5.3 Implications for the Chinese Film Industry 
The success of localization of the foreign capital demonstrates a possible successful entry 
model for foreign media corporations into mainland China, and as well, implications for 
the Chinese film industry. First of all, the penetration of foreign media corporations bring 
in experiences in sustained expansion in media markets for the Chinese film industry. As 
a weak competitor, an effective way for the mainland Chinese media industries to be 
competitive is to imitate the foreign media corporations and take advantage of the 
Chinese state central control. A media corporation like Warner China Film HG, guided 
and authorized by state policy, as well as joint with Chinese private capital and foreign 
media capital, is most favorable in the competition with foreign media corporations. Such 
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a media group can enjoy the allocation of state resources, flexibility and talent by the 
privately owned media company and the advanced experience brought by the foreign 
media corporations. 
Secondly, a healthly and sustainable film industry should obtain various levels of 
film productions一blockbusters and low-budget, commercial and art, targeted global and 
targeted local. Similarly, Geng Xilin，General Manager of Film Distribution in China 
Film Group, also supports the idea that the Chinese film market is a very diverse one with 
diverse audiences, thus the Chinese film market should embrace diverse contents and 
different levels of productions that cater to the diverse tastes of audiences (interview with 
Geng Xilin, April 1 1 � 2 0 0 7 ) . 
Thirdly, the success of Crazy Stone has aroused people's awareness of the new 
talents in filmmaking and the potential resources of film talents are a big advantage of the 
mainland Chinese film industry. Responding to different seminars and forums after the 
inspiring success of Crazy Stone, the Chinese government is also aware of the 
importance of fostering young talents for the development of the Chinese film industry. 
In January 2007, SARFT issued a sponsorship project for young directors and will take 
this project into a supportive policy. Ning Hao became one of the first sponsored 
directors in this project. 
Fourthly, this case study shows that autonomy in film creation can also bring success 
to the film. In previous cases, investors or owners always held control over the film 
creation to assure it was going on the right track. In the creation of Crazy Stone, the 
director Ning Hao and his production team had flill autonomy in creation, which proved 
to be successful in the market. However, autonomy in creation can also bring some 
problems, for example, film content that contradicts the Chinese authority and censorship 
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guide lines. Hence, a balance should be made between control and autonomy over the 
creation of films in the Chinese film industry and it is also an effective way to encourage 
more film genres and themes to be produced. 
Last but not least, this study also shows that having a strong local base and sufficient 
domestic market is crucial to the sustenance and development of a film industry. With a 
large domestic audience base, the actual economic advantage for the mainland Chinese 
media industry should always accrue from building capacity within, rather than looking 
outwards (Keane, 2006). The basis to expand the local market and develop the global 
markets is to invite substantial capital to invest in the film industry, especially the 
Chinese rising private capital. However, the Chinese film industry still represents a high 
threshold for the Chinese private investors. Media in mainland China still function as 
ideological tools, and the Chinese film industry is still highly confined by the 
government's multiple restrictions. With the strict state control and constraints, the 
Chinese film industry has long been an industry with low profit margins. This in return 
causes private investments to shrink back and further discourages the development and 
expansion of the Chinese film industry. Even the main business of those major private 
media players in the Chinese film industry nowadays, is other than filmmaking; on the 
contrary, filmmaking makes up only a small proportion of their entire business and 
always has to be sustained by other parts of their business. For example, Hengdian 
Group's main business focuses are electronics, pharmaceutical and chemical industry, 
and the entertainment business, including film industry, occupies only about 3% of its 
total annual revenue (interview with Shi Weidong, March 26出，2007). One more 
example is another major private media company in mainland China, Poly Huayi. Its 
parent company Poly Group was developed by international trading and now mainly 
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depends on trading and real estate business. Chinese filmmaking and the Chinese film 
industry cannot survive all by itself. Therefore, the real opportunity for the mainland 
Chinese film industry to fully develop lies in the further openness of the state media 
policies. Only if the media policies are more relaxed and the margin of profits increases 
can the film industry attract more capital to invest in the industry and drive the flourishing 
development of the industry. 
In light of a film industry perspective, Warner China Film HG exhibits a complete 
industrial chain and strengths in market competition it brings to the company in the 
Chinese film market. This trend towards a complete industrial chain, from film 
production, distribution to exhibition is also the path for the future development in the 
mainland Chinese film industry. Provided that any part in the industrial chain is 
conditioned by other partners or companies, the response and corresponding action to the 
market changes will probably be postponed; moreover, costs will increase due to the 
coordination expense. According to the research by a cultural industries research group, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the rising Chinese private capitals, especially those 
that are joint ventures with state-owned capital and various other forms of capital, are 
currently accelerating their pace in industrial integration towards a complete industrial 
chain.68 For example, CITIC Media Group, is in a joint venture with the China Film 
Group and accesses the film production, distribution and other film products 
development; meanwhile, CITIC Media Group is also involved in satellite 
communication, cable TV, internet, networking relating business, all of which are now 
forming an integration of content production, distribution channels, networking and other 
resources to facilitate the competition of the company.69 Another example, Poly Huayi 
Media Group has processed its integration of film production, distribution and exhibition 
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with several branches of film companies?® The formation of such an industrial chain is 
always accomplished by joint venture or merger with other media companies, and this 
industrial integration has been a main trend in the mainland Chinese film market. No 
matter which foreign media investors or domestic media companies, they all show great 
interest towards this kind of joint venture company. 
For the Chinese private media companies, this case implies that under the 
relatively favorable state policies, they should more actively partner with the foreign 
investors and seize the great opportunities to equip themselves. Through collaboration 
and joint venture, Chinese private media companies can be strengthened and become 
more competitive in the penetration of global media conglomerates. 
5.4 Limitation and Discussion 
However, the case of Crazy Stone is to a certain extent an occasional success. The 
Chinese government's policies towards foreign investors and film industry are constantly 
changing and the foreign investors are still finding their way and adapting their models in 
the mainland Chinese film market, so whether the successful experience of Crazy Stone 
can be duplicated in the future Chinese filmmaking is not certain. Meanwhile, as we can 
observe in this study, co-production in this period has not yet flilly operated under a pure 
market economy. The Chinese government still intervenes in the film market by 
administrative means, e.g., film policies. Therefore, the extent of market openness and 
the rights of private and foreign capital partnership are highly subject to state policy. The 
Chinese state still has the absolute power in decision making, and the state-owned China 
Film Group Corporation still holds the privilege in film distribution and exhibition. 
Nevertheless, as China's accelerative access to the WTO, the Chinese film industry will 
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gradually develop towards a market economy and gain exposure to global competition. In 
addition, in the current stage these various kinds of capital have not yet truly conflicted or 
competed, because the Chinese film industry is not mature and still has huge room for 
development. Nevertheless, after a few years when the Chinese film market is 
approaching maturity and solidity, there will probably be a reshuffle in the mainland 
Chinese film industry, and that will probably be the time that an oligopoly in the industry 
comes into being. 
Besides the above objective limitations, this study also has some subjective 
limitations. The first one is the limitation of generalization. Crazy Stone was a contingent 
case. It combined every favorable factor that contributed to it success, got the right 
content catering to the right targets at the right time. The success of Crazy Stone cannot 
be generated into a 'formula' that can be adapted to all the films, and whether Crazy 
Stone will induce a new film genre is still questionable. However, Crazy Stone was a 
necessary case study. As the reviews of the current development and dilemma of the 
Chinese film industry show, co-production and foreign involvement in the Chinese 
filmmaking are major trends; in addition, the audiences are a bit fed up with the Chinese 
blockbusters and desire something new. Hence, this study can generalize, firstly, the 
investment mode by Chinese state-owned capital, Chinese private capital and foreign 
capital will be a main model in the future development of the Chinese film industry, and 
secondly, the foreign-local cooperation will continue to be an important route for 
filmmaking for indigenous Chinese cultures. The second limitation is that the Chinese 
private capital receives relatively little examination in this study, and the intention of the 
Chinese state to embrace and integrate the private media capital has not been clearly 
examined. As previously discussed, many symbiotic relations exist in the Chinese film 
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industry between the state, the Chinese private investors and the foreign investors, e.g., 
without the involvement of the Chinese state, the forming of the Chinese-foreign joint 
venture company Warner China Film HG may not have been approved, and without a 
strong background or network with the Chinese state, private and foreign investors 
cannot be joint venture or co-produce with the Chinese state and enjoy privileges. 
However, it is hard to prove these underlying rules due to accessibility issues. Thirdly, the 
state's role in the process of localization of foreign media capital and negotiations 
between this newly constituted power bloc has not been fully tackled. In researching the 
cultural industries, a key word is access. This study approached from a political economy 
perspective to examine the mainland Chinese film industry, it seems to be a great black-
box which is mysterious to outsiders. In the process of making appointments for 
interviews or doing the interviews with the insiders, I find it hard or even impossible to 
get access to that black-box which really conceals the rules of the game, the power 
relations and negotiations between different players in the industry. The deficiency and 
absence of the examination of the ' black-box' was the biggest limitation in this study. 
Many film industry practitioners regard the formation of Warner China Film HG as 
a milestone in the development of the mainland Chinese film industry. The penetration of 
foreign media capital inevitably makes a great impact on the Chinese film industry. In the 
initial stage of Warner China Film HG, some media practitioners held optimistic attitudes 
about the openness of the state policies, and predicted that more mainland Chinese-
foreign joint venture film companies would be approved to establish. However, two years 
after the formation of Warner China Film HG, no more Chinese-foreign joint venture film 
companies have been constructed. Moreover, in my interviews, practitioners hold back 
their opinions and mentioned that no such joint venture companies will be approved by 
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the Chinese government for the next few years. Similarly, foreign investment in 
constructing cinemas it is still highly subject to the government's policies. Providing that 
the foreign media capital can only enjoy a short period of participating in the Chinese film 
industry as 'testing period', they cannot really benefit from the Chinese market. 
Therefore, as an important step of their domination in global capitalism, will these 
transnational conglomerates continue their penetrations in the mainland Chinese market? 
What will be the future strategies of these transnational conglomerates to exploit the 
Chinese 'diamond mine'? What will the result be of the contest between state control, the 
rising Chinese private capital and the foreign media capital? Influenced by this contest, 
what will the future be for the development of the mainland Chinese film industry and 
what 'Chinese characteristics' will emerge that are different from other film industries in 
the world, e.g., Hollywood? Can the Chinese film industry or the regional film industry 
successfully be another 'center' to counter or compete with Hollywood rather than co-
solidify the western domination? These pending questions about the Chinese film 
industry will be good points to follow up and be the basis for future research. 
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59 Warner China Film HG's marketing plan for Crazy Stone, June 2006. 
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60 For example, http://blog.sina.com.cn/ii/46t37fb501000344. one of the most popular star blogs. 
Many media have paid attention to this blogging hit. See 
http://media.people.com.cn/GB/22114/57873/index.html 
61 Search on www.baidu.com with a key word 'Crazy Stone' (in Chinese), it shows that there are 
approximately 3,750,000 websites on this topic. 
62 Many media have mentioned the saying 'Chinese-made film protection month', but SARFT denied 
this exists and emphasized that the Chinese government will not intervene in the film market by 
administrative means. See some of those reporting, 
http://leisiire.hangzhou.com.cn/20050801/cal082971.litm , http://xh.xhbv.net/html/2006-
06/22/content_4770601 .htm and http://info.research.hc36Q.eom/2006/06/12095519445.shtml . 
“ S e e http://ent.sina.com.en/m/c/2006-07-l 1/10251153457.html 





66 See http://ent.sina.com.cn/in/c/2006-07-18/01551161913.html 
67 CEPA Annex 5: Definition of "Service Supplier" and Related Requirements. See 
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/files/annex5.pclf 
68 See http://www.51 dh.net/magazine/html/326/32666.htin 
69 See http://www.ccsic.com/movie/ 
70 See http://ent.sina.com.cn/2004-08-09/1437468427.html 
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Appendix 1. 
2006 TOP 10 Box-office in mainland China (Chinese-made Film) 
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Appendix 1. 
Interim Provisions on Operation Qualification Access for Movie Enterprises 
Order of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television and the Ministry of 
Commerce of the People's Republic of China 
(No. 43) 
The Interim Provisions on Operation Qualification Access for Movie Enterprises, 
which were examined and adopted at the executive meeting of the State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television on June 15，2004, and by the Ministry 
of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, are hereby promulgated, and shall 
come into force on November 10，2004. 
Director General of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television Xu 
Guangchun 
Minister of the Ministry of Commerce, PRC Bo Xilai 
October 10，2004 
Chapter I General Provisions 
Article 1 These Provisions are formulated in accordance with the Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures, Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Chinese-foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures and the 
Regulations on the Administration of Movies in order to bring non-government 
sectors into full play to accelerate the development of movie industry, cultivate 
market subjects, regulate market access, reinforce the overall strength and 
competitiveness of the movie industry, promote the flourishing of socialist movie 
industry, and satisfy the people's demands in their spiritual and cultural lives. 
Article 2 These Provisions shall apply to the administration of qualification access 
for companies, enterprises and other economic organizations inside China to operate 
movie production, distribution, projection, import and export, and for overseas 
companies, enterprises and other economic organizations to participate in the 
operation of movie production and projection. 
Article 3 The state applies a permit system to the operation qualifications for movie 
production, distribution, projection, import and export. 
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Article 4 The State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (hereinafter 
referred to as SARFT) shall be the national administrative department for operation 
qualification access in the industry of movie production, distribution, projection, 
import and export. 
Chapter II Movie Production 
Article 5 The state permits companies, enterprises and other economic 
organizations inside China (excluding foreign-funded enterprises) to establish movie 
production companies. A company, enterprise or other economic organization inside 
China that applies to establish a movie production company shall file an application 
to SARFT. 
(1) Where two or more companies, enterprises or other economic organizations inside 
China (excluding foreign-funded enterprises) which have obtained the Permit for 
Movie Production intend to jointly establish a movie production company, the 
conditions and procedures for application are as follows: 
1, The registered capital of the movie production company shall be no less than RMB 
1 million Yuan; and 
2. An application letter, the contract, the articles of association, and a photocopy of 
the business license of each party issued by the administration for industry and 
commerce, and the notice on pre-ratification of the company's name, shall be 
submitted. 
(2) A company, enterprise or other economic organization inside China (excluding 
foreign-funded enterprise) that has not obtained the Permit for Movie Production 
must, when shooting the film for the first time, establish a movie and television 
culture company, which shall apply for the Permit for Film Production (for Single 
Film). The conditions and procedures for obtaining the Permit for Film Production 
(for Single Film) are as follows: 
1. All various movie and television culture entities registered in the administration for 
industry and commerce at the prefecture (city) level or above are qualified for 
obtaining the Permit for Film Production (for Single Film); 
2. An application letter, a photocopy of the business license issued by the 
administration for industry and commerce, a proof on the sources of funds for 
producing the film, the screenplay of the film to be produced (outline of the story) 
shall be submitted in triplicate; 
3. SARFT shall, within 20 working days, examine the production qualification under 
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application and the film screenplay (outline of the story). If they are examined to be 
qualified, a Permit for Film Production (for Single Film) shall be issued. The 
applicant shall bring the approval document issued by SARFT to go through the 
relevant procedures in the local administration for industry and commerce. If, 
however, SARFT does not grant the approval, it shall reply in writing to explain the 
reason thereof; 
4. An entity that has obtained the Permit for Film Production (for Single Film) shall 
have the right to produce a film for only once. The producer may produce the film 
either independently or jointly with other production entities (including movie and 
television culture entities); and 
5. The Permit for Film Production (for Single Film) shall be subject to a system of 
filing one application for each film concerned. 
(3) The conditions and procedures for a company, enterprise or other economic 
organization inside China (excluding foreign-funded enterprises), which has obtained 
the Permit for Film Production (for Single Film), to apply to independently or jointly 
establish a movie production company are as follows: 
1. It has invested in shooting two or more films in the form of Permit for Film 
Production (for Single Film); 
2. Its registered capital shall be no less than RMB 1 million Yuan; 
3. The application letter, its business license issued by the administration for industry 
and commerce (for joint establishment of a movie production company, the contract, 
articles of association, a photocopy of each party's business license issued by the 
administration for industry and commerce shall be provided in addition), and the 
notice on pre-ratification of the company's name shall be submitted; and 
4. The Permit for Film Production (for Single Film) and the Permit for Public 
Projection of Films, by which it has invested in producing the two films, and other 
relevant documents shall be submitted. 
(4) To an applicant meeting the requirements in Items (1) and (3)，SARFT shall issue 
the Permit for Movie Production within 20 working days. The applicant shall bring 
the approval document issued by SARFT to go through the relevant procedures in the 
local administration for industry and commerce, and shall report to SARFT for 
archival purposes. If，however, SARFT does not grant the approval, it shall reply in 
writing to explain the reason thereof. 
Article 6 A company, enterprise or other economic organization inside China 
(hereinafter referred to as the Chinese party) is permitted to establish a movie 
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production company (hereinafter referred to as joint venture company) with an 
overseas company, enterprise or other economic organization (hereinafter referred to 
as the foreign party) in the form of equity joint venture or cooperative joint venture. 
To apply for establishing a joint venture company, the Chinese party shall file an 
application to SARFT. The conditions and procedures for application are as follows: 
(1) The Chinese party has obtained the Permit for Movie Production or two Permits 
for Film Production (for Single Film); 
(2) The registered capital of the joint venture company shall be no less than RMB 5 
million Yuan; 
(3) The proportion of foreign capital among the registered capital shall not exceed 
49%; 
(4) If an applicant meets the requirements in Items (1) through (3)，the Chinese party 
shall submit to SARFT the application letter concerning the project, the feasibility 
study report, the contract, the articles of association, the registration certificate (or 
identity certificate) of each party to the joint venture, the credit standing proof，and 
the notice on pre-ratification of the company name, etc. SARFT shall verify such 
documents in accordance with the law. If the applicant is verified to be qualified, 
SARFT shall issue the ratification document and the Permit for Movie Production; 
(5) If an applicant meets the requirements in Items (1) through (4)，the Chinese party 
shall submit the ratification document issued by SARFT and the documents listed in 
Item (4) of this Article to the Ministry of Commerce for approval. The Ministry of 
Commerce shall lawfully make a decision on whether to approve the application or 
not. If the application is approved, the Approval Certificate for the Foreign-funded 
Enterprise shall be issued to the applicant. If，however, it is not approved, the 
Ministry of Commerce shall reply in writing to state the reason thereof; and 
(6) The applicant shall bring the approval documents of SARFT and the Ministry of 
Commerce to go through the relevant procedures in the local administration for 
industry and commerce. 
Article 7 The movie production companies that have obtained the Permit for 
Movie Production in accordance with Article 5 and Article 6 of these Provisions shall 
enjoy rights and assume obligations equal to those of state-owned movie production 
entities in accordance with the Regulations on the Administration of Movies. 
Article 8 A company, enterprise or other economic organization inside China 
(excluding foreign-funded enterprise) is permitted to establish a movie technology 
company, to reform basic facilities and technical equipment for movie production and 
projection. The conditions and procedures for application are as follows: 
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(1) Its registered capital shall be no less than RMB 5 million Yuan; 
(2) The application letter, its business license issued by the administration for industry 
and commerce (for joint establishment of a movie technology company, the contract, 
articles of association, a photocopy of each party's business license shall be provided 
in addition), and the notice on pre-ratification of the company's name shall be 
submitted; and 
(3) If an applicant meets the requirements in Items (1) and (2)，it shall bring the 
approval document issued by SARFT to go through the relevant procedures at the 
local administration for industry and commerce, and submit it to SARFT for archival 
purposes. If, however, SARFT does not grant the approval, it shall reply in writing to 
state the reason thereof. 
Article 9 A company, enterprise or other economic organization inside China 
(hereinafter referred to as the Chinese party) is permitted to establish a movie 
technology company with an overseas company, enterprise or other economic 
organization (hereinafter referred to as the foreign party) in the form of equity joint 
venture or cooperative joint venture, and to reform basic facilities and technical 
equipment for movie production and projection. The conditions and procedures for 
application are as follows: 
(1) The company's registered capital shall be no less than RMB 5 million Yuan; 
(2) The proportion of foreign capital among the registered capital shall not exceed 
49%, and the shares may be controlled by foreign capital in the provinces and cities 
approved by the state; 
(3) If an applicant meets the requirements in Items (1) and (2)，the Chinese party shall 
submit to SARFT the application letter concerning the project, the feasibility study 
report, the contract, the articles of association, the registration certificate (or identity 
certificate) of each party to the joint venture, the credit standing proof, the notice on 
pre-ratification of the company's name, etc. SARFT shall verify such documents in 
accordance with the law. If the applicant is verified to be qualified, SARFT shall issue 
the ratification document. 
(4) If an applicant meets the requirements in Items (1) through (3)，the Chinese party 
shall submit the ratification document issued by SARFT and the documents listed in 
Item (3) of this Article to the Ministry of Commerce for approval. The Ministry of 
Commerce shall make a decision on whether to approve the application or not in 
accordance with the law. If the application is approved, the Approval Certificate for 
the Foreign-funded Enterprise shall be issued to the applicant. If, however, it is not 
approved, the Ministry of Commerce shall reply in writing to state the reason thereof; 
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and 
(5) The applicant shall bring the approval documents of SARFT and the Ministry of 
Commerce to go through the relevant procedures in the local administration for 
industry and commerce. 
Chapter III Movie Distribution and Projection 
Article 10 The companies, enterprises and other economic organizations inside 
China (excluding foreign-funded enterprises) are encouraged to establish companies 
exclusively operating the distribution of domestically produced films. The conditions 
and procedures for application are as follows: 
(1) The registered capital shall be no less than RMB 500,000 Yuan; 
(2) The applicant has been entrusted by a movie production entity to have represented 
the distribution of two movies or has been entrusted by a TV play production entity to 
have distributed two TV plays; 
(3) An application letter, a photocopy of the business license issued by the 
administration for industry and commerce, the notice on pre-ratification of the 
company's name, the proof on being entrusted to represent the distribution of movies 
and TV plays, and other relevant documents shall be submitted. And 
(4) If the applicant meets the requirements in Items (1) through (3) and applies to 
SARFT for establishing a company exclusively operating the distribution of 
domestically produced films, SARFT shall, within 20 working days, issue the 
Operation Permit for Movie Distribution which permits the distribution of 
domestically produced films throughout the country. If the applicant applies to the 
local movie administration department at the provincial level for establishing a 
company exclusively operating the distribution of domestically produced films, the 
said local movie administration department shall, within 20 working days, issue the 
Operation Permit for Movie Distribution of the province (autonomous region, or 
municipality directly under the Central Government) which permits exclusive 
operation of domestically produced films in this province (autonomous region, or 
municipality directly under the Central Government). The applicant shall bring the 
approval document issued by the movie administration department to go through the 
relevant procedures in the local administration for industry and commerce. If, 
however, the approval is not granted, a written reply stating the reason thereof shall be 
issued to the applicant. 
Article 11 SARFT shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions on annual 
assessment of distribution and projection of domestically produced films, make 
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annual assessment on the companies having obtained the Operation Permit for Movie 
Distribution. 
Article 12 The film cinema circuit companies are permitted to be integrated in 
either a close or a loose type. They are encouraged to be re-integrated on a trans-
provincial film cinema circuit basis and in compliance with the principle of 
administration on by one. It is not permitted to entirely merge film cinema circuits by 
administration areas. Integration of film cinema circuits shall be submitted to SARFT 
for approval. 
The companies, enterprises and other economic organizations inside China 
(excluding foreign-funded enterprises) are encouraged to invest in the existing film 
cinema circuit companies or invest in establishing film cinema circuit companies 
independently. 
(1) In the event of investment in an existing film cinema circuit company in the form 
of participation with shares, the share participant must, within three years, invest no 
less than RMB 30 million Yuan in building up or rebuilding cinemas in this film 
cinema circuit. In the event of investment in an existing film cinema circuit company 
in a share-control form, the share controller must, within three years, invest no less 
than RMB 40 million Yuan in building up or rebuilding cinemas in the film cinema 
circuit. In the event of independent establishment of a film cinema circuit company 
within the province or one nationwide, the establisher must, within three years, invest 
no less than RMB 50 million Yuan in building up or rebuilding cinemas in the film 
cinema circuit; 
(2) The establishment of a film cinema circuit company within a province 
(autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government) shall be 
approved by the movie administration department under the people's government of 
the province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central 
Government within 20 working days, and be reported to SARFT for archival 
purposes. The establishment of a trans-provincial film cinema circuit company shall 
be approved by SARFT within 20 working days. The applicant shall bring the 
approval document issued by the movie administration department to go through the 
relevant procedures in the local administration for industry and commerce. If, 
however, SARFT (or the said administration department) does not grant the approval, 
it shall reply in writing to state the reason thereof. 
Article 13 The companies, enterprises and other economic organizations inside 
China (excluding foreign-funded enterprises) are encouraged to establish movie 
distribution and projection cinema circuits for juveniles and children. 
(1) Any applicant who has concluded film supply agreements with no less than 20 
high schools, elementary schools, juveniles' palaces, children's activities centers, 
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cinemas, theaters, auditoriums, etc. within the province (autonomous region, or 
municipality directly under the Central Government) may apply to the local movie 
administration department at the provincial level to establish a movie distribution and 
projection cinema circuit for juveniles and children within the province, autonomous 
region，or municipality directly under the Central Government; 
(2) Any applicant who has concluded film supply agreements with no less than 30 
high schools, elementary schools, juveniles' palaces, children's activities centers, 
cinemas, theaters, auditoriums, etc. in different provinces, autonomous regions, or 
municipalities directly under the Central Government may apply to SARFT to 
establish a movie distribution and projection cinema circuit for juveniles and children 
which covers the said different provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities 
directly under the Central Government; 
(3) The establishment of a film cinema circuit company within the province, 
autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government shall be 
approved by the movie administration department under the local people's 
government of the province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the 
Central Government within 20 working days, and be reported to SARFT for archival 
purposes. The establishment of a trans-provincial film cinema circuit company shall 
be approved by SARFT within 20 working days. The applicant shall bring the 
approval document issued by the movie administration department to go through the 
relevant procedures in the local administration for industry and commerce. If, 
however, SARFT (or the involved movie administration department) does not grant 
the approval, it shall reply in writing to state the reason thereof. 
Article 14 The companies, enterprises, other economic organizations and individuals 
inside China are encouraged to, in accordance with the Regulations on the 
Administration of Movies, operate movie distribution and projection business in 
various forms in rural areas throughout the country, as well as movie projection 
business in urban communities and schools. 
Article 15 The companies, enterprises, other economic organizations and 
individuals inside China are encouraged to investing in building up and rebuilding 
cinemas. Whoever intends to operate movie projection business must apply to the 
local movie administration department at the county level or above for approval, and 
go through the relevant procedures in the local administration for industry and 
commerce. 
The foreign-funded cinemas shall be administered in accordance with the Interim 
Provisions on the Administration of Foreign-funded Cinemas. 
Chapter IV Movie Import and Export 
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Article 16 The import of movies shall be exclusively operated by movie import 
enterprises approved by SARFT. The distribution of imported movies nationwide 
shall be carried out by the distribution companies which are approved by SARFT and 
which have right to distribute imported movies nationwide. 
Article 17 The film production entities are encouraged to export in various channels 
domestically produced films for which the Permit for Public Projection of Films has 
been obtained. 
Chapter V Supplementary Provisions 
Article 18 The Permits for Movie Production and Operation Permits for Movie 
Distribution issued by SARFT shall be subject to a system of inspection every other 
year. The local movie administration departments shall, pursuant to their 
administrative power, apply an annual inspection system to the issued Operation 
Permits for Movie Distribution and Operation Permits for Movie Projection. 
Article 19 Those matters not covered by these Provisions shall be handled in 
accordance with the relevant provisions in the Regulations on the Administration of 
Movies. 
Article 20 The interpretation of these Provisions shall remain with SARFT and the 
Ministry of Commerce. 
Article 21 These Provisions shall come into force on November 10，2004. The 
Interim Provisions on the Access of Operation Qualifications for Movie Production, 
Distribution and Projection promulgated by SARFT (No. 20 of SARFT), and the 
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Qualification Certifying System for 
Obtaining the Permit for Film Production (for Single Film) (for Trial Implementation) 
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